Science in Christian Perspective
Colin Duriez
Reprinted from the Christian Graduate 22, No. 3, 24 (1969)
From: JASA 22 (December 1970): 128-131.
II
'William Paley, the eighteenth-century Christian apologist,
pictured God
as making the universe like a watch which He wound up, left to tick,
and occasionally
repaired. For those modern Christians who are ashamed of Paley, it will come as
a shock that a kind of teleological argument from mechanical design
is seriously
being reintroduced by the distinguished nonChristian scientist and pilosopher,
Dr. Michael Polanyi. This is all the more interesting because, instead of God
being the designer, the design is attributed to an evolutionary process which
is not personified, and which cannot be described in the scientific language of
physics and chemistry.
Considering the universe for a moment as a machine, let us look at
Polanyi's argument.
Almost all scientists today believe, of course, that, in the words of Polanyi,
"so far as life can be represented as a mechanism, it is explained by the
laws of inanimate nature". Dr. Polanyi's position is
antithetical, and this
is his revolution: "I differ ... most from biologists, by holding that no
mechanism-be it a machine or a machine-like feature of an
organism-can be represented
in terms of physics and chemistry." Even more strongly than
this, he expresses
incredulity that
for 300 years writers who contested the possibility of explaining life by physics and chemistry argued by affirming that living things are not, or not wholly, machinelike, instead of pointing not that the mere existence of machinelike functions in living beings proves that life cannot be explained in terms of physics and
chemistry.
The reasons he gives for his hypothesis fall into three major points.
1. His first reason is that machines are not reducible
to a description in terms of physico-chemical laws. This is because
they are defined
by the distinctive functions which the mind of man has imposed upon
them; machines
are shaped and designed for a special purpose. A 'washing-machine' is defined
by its function of 'washing clothes', and the clothes-washing function is what
moulds it to its typical recognizable shape.
An illustration reminiscent of Paley that Polanyi gives in several
essay-articles
is the watch: a physical and chemical molecular topography of his watch would
not give enough information to tell you 'what' it is. In contrast, a
child's description-the
thingamajig you have on your wrist to tell the time with-gives this
information.
There is a related problem when more obvious means of conveying information are
considered. A physical chemical topography of the page you are reading at this
moment would say nothing of its word content, or the total meaning of
those words.
2. It will prove easier to understand his second
point if it is realized that all machines as a whole make
up a boundary condition (a term borrowed from physics). What Dr. Polanyi calls
a 'boundary condition' may be taken to mean any form which is
distinct in quality
from all other forms, and which can have a diversity of possible contents. The
sonnet-form in poetry would be such a 'boundary condition'; so would
the medieval
Christian and early modern scientific concept of the universe, and so would
be
such a thing
as speech. (The latter is one of Polanyi's own examples.) But the
'boundary condition'
also necessarily includes the function defining a machine which we discussed in
the first point. Thus we may say-even though the more important constituent of
the two is not made explicit-that it is the structure or form of the machine,
with its function, which makes up its boundary condition.
In all machines, the boundary conditions exert a control or organization over
the materials which compose them, even though the material nevertheless works
autonomously according to physico-chemical laws. Polanyi concludes
therefore that
any mechanism is clearly under a hierarchical dual control. The 'upper level'
is under the control of a particular boundary condition-constituted
by the distinctive
machine-structure plus its related function-which harnesses the baser
'lower level'
controlled according to physical and chemical laws. If, for example, a car is
smashed into a cube in a junk-yard, the 'lower level' laws of physics
and chemistry
continue to work just as inexorably in the cube as they did in the car when it
was speeding down the freeway.
By this principle of boundary condition, Polanyi says that it follows
that machine-like
structures of living beings appear likewise to be irreducible to
terms of physics
and chemistry. A biological organism has the two aspects of a
boundary condition:
its organs are defined by their vital functions (for example, the
digestive function
of the stomach), and its total shape or 'morphology', with the shapes
of its parts,
enable it to be recognized; both aspects together tell 'what'
it is. The former aspect partially parallels the function of a
machine. The more
important formal or morphological aspect of the biological organism parallels
the structure of the machine. Without these irreducible plant and
animal morphologies
or forms, of course, biological science would not exist. It
categorizes the observed
in plants and animals. On the impossibility of biology ever being a molecular
science, Polanyi says,
Even supposing we did produce a mathematical expression for the shape of one living specimen, including all its anatomy at one particular moment, the formula would not cover its changes due to growth and decline and it would of course fail even more widely to cover the variety of specimens belonging to one species.
Not only is a comprehensive species a boundary condition, but also the unity of
identity of a growing plant or animal from seed to adult.
3. The third step in Polanyi's argument is this: the code or 'template'-as Prof.
J. D. Bernal calls it on the helix or coil of the DNA molecule is similarly not
describable in terms of physics and chemistry. James Watson and Sir
Francis Crick,
and the majority of biologists, believe that DNA templates determine the growth
and morphologies (forms) of all the animate world, making life
"one biochemically
interconnected unity every element of which, down to the smallest
virus, operates
its synthesis by this . . . molecular mechanism" of DNA (Bensal, Science
in History, p. 198). This seems to prove the contrary to Polanyi's
view; it seems
to make 'life' determinable by the inanimate laws of physics and chemistry.
But, argues Polanyi, DNA is in itself a boundary condition, and as such cannot
be reduced to physicochemical laws. In the first place, the DNA is defined by
its genetic function, the biological equivalent to a machine's reason for being
constructed. In the second place, and more important, it bears a
quantity of information
that "determines the genetic development of an organism".
This is because,
by self-duplication, the information-content of the DNA mechanism
induces in posterity
"an equivalent amount of organic differentation". In short,
it in reality
determines the plan or animal morphology, or structure.
This 'shaping' aspect of DNA has two implications: (i) as an
information-conveyor,
the DNA code, like a page of print, defies reduction to physics and chemistry;
(ii) as DNA hears a pattern or blue-print 'informed' with the shape
of the potential
new organism, the pattern must be regarded as just as much a morphological (or
structural) feature of that organism as that shape is. As a
morphological feature
of an organism, the DNA pattern cannot therefore he reduced to physico-chemical
laws. This means simply that DNA in its vital function of shaping life fulfills
the requisites of a boundary condition, and as such controls or organizes from
a 'higher level' the various chemicals which materially make up the DNA coil;
constituents which, as the 'lower level', also work autonomously according to
the laws of physics and chemistry. This 'upper level' boundary condition says
Poaoyi "brings the vital shaping of offspring by DNA into consonance with
the shaping of a machine by the engineer".
Cosmic Implications
Moving from the micro level to the cosmic, Polanyi does not regard the universe
to be under a boundary condition in its totality. He believes it to
he essentially
disorganized; that is, in a probable state according to
the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This does not relieve him of the
designer-difficulty,
however. His belief that the animate portion of nature and manmade machines are
controlled by boundary conditions, leaves open the question of
morphogeoesis (the
emergence of form from chaos) and the beginnings of consciousness
just as urgently
as if the universe is regarded as a mechanism. More naively, the question could
he formulated, 'Who or what is the designer of the mechanisms of
animate nature?'
It is significant that Dr. Polanyi feels the current theories of evolution to
he quite inadequate to these problems. This is because, in describing
biological
organisms, the biologist assumes their shapes (morphologies; boundary
conditions)
to he valid scientific data. Yet the biologist, then attributes morphogenesis
and the arrival of consciousness to natural selection. Polanyi, in
terms too technical
to repeat here, argues clearly that such a probable or predictable selection as
natural selection in such an arrangement as the four mobile chemical
substituents
on the DNA coil would allow no information-content, content which
obviously must
be there if DNA carries the blueprints for all living organisms.
Information requires
an improbable or unpredictable organization by an imposed boundary condition.
A partial but good analogy is the way wordsymbols have been arranged
in this article
by my mind. The words are not in an alphabetical sequence, or in any
other orderly
predictable sequences based on such factors as the numbers of letters
or syllables
(e.g., ones before twos, twos before threes, etc.). Rather they serve me in my
communication-attempt, and are selected and organized from my vocabulary with
this function in view, although of course some modifications of style
and grammar
have taken place.
At this exciting point in his theory, Dr. Polanyi
makes a profound optimistic jump in his reasoning. Mechanical control
in animate
nature, he points out, is not determinable from the 'lower level' of
physicochemical
laws. Furthermore, there is a hierarchy of mechanisms with man at the top. Man
alone has sufficient consciousness to impose boundary conditions
without a prewritten
blueprint such as DNA; man alone can make blueprints. If biological structures
are irreducible to physico-chemical laws, and likewise such things as man-made
machines and communication symbol-systems, then why cannot man's consciousness
be accepted as irreducible? Such an irreducibility frees a man from
the shackles
of believing himself to he a machine whose blueprint is completely prewritten,
a belief strongly adhered to by Sir Francis Crick or Gilbert Ryle,
for example.
Dr. Polanyi's optimism concerning the reality of consciousness is a
logical jump
because he at present has no basis for it:
We need a theory of knowledge which shows tip the fallacy of a positivistic scepticism and authorises our knowledge of entities governed by higher principles (boundary conditions). Any higher principle can be
known only by dwelling in the particulars governed by it. Any attempt to observe a higher level of existence by a scrutiny of its several particulars must fail.
To 'authorise' the higher levels we observe in animate nature, and sense in our
own consciousness, a designer is necessary, a designer who has some
manlike qualities
(e.g., the ability to create blueprints for mechanisms). This
designer must also
he big enough, at least, to control and organize the vastness of the apparent
hierarchy of animate nature. Against bigness such as this, the nations are as
a drop in a bucket.
Sources for Polanyi
'Life Transcending Physics and Chemistry' (Chemical and Engineering News, August
21, 1967.)
'On the Modern Mind' (Encounter, May 1965). 'The Structure of
Consciousness' (Brain,
Part IV, 1966).
'Life's Irreducible Structure' (Science, Vol. 160, June 21, 1968).