The
historical sciences are related to other sciences, and all sciences
share the same basic goals and methods.
Scientific Methods in Historical
Sciences
For most scientists, the
main goal of science is to find truth. They want to construct theories
that are
true, that
correspond with reality by correctly describing what really happens
in nature. In a search for true theories, the main thinking tools — the
generation and evaluation of theories, using observation, imagination,
and logic — are described in an introduction to
The
Simple Logic of Scientific Method and in this brief summary from
it:
As shown
in the diagram below, OBSERVATIONS (from physical experiments) are used
to imaginatively generate a THEORY, which can be used with if-then logic
(in a mental experiment) to make PREDICTIONS, so you can do a REALITY
CHECK by comparing observations with predictions, to test whether "the
way you think it is" (by assuming the theory is true) corresponds
to "the way it really is."

Is there a scientific method? If "method" means "a
single method, used in the same way by all scientists at all times," the
answer is NO, so we should not talk about The Scientific Method.
Are there scientific methods? Yes. The
main methods of scientific thinking, including the foundation of science — the "reality
checks" made by observing reality and using logic — are used
by all scientists. But details change with time and culture, and
vary from one area of science to another, and from one scientist to another.
Does historical science
produce reliable conclusions? This is not a useful question,
because it tends to generate a yes-or-no response claiming that "YES,
[all] historical science [always] produces [totally] reliable conclusions" or "NO,
[all] historical science [always] produces [totally] unreliable conclusions." Each
of these extreme generalizations is wrong, because each implies the "all
or none" claims inside the brackets, [ ].
If we want to avoid these
wrong answers, we should avoid asking a general question that encourages
simplistic "all or none" thinking. Instead, we should
ask specific questions about particular historical situations and claims,
to encourage sophisticated "degrees of reliability" thinking. We
should carefully examine the evidence-and-logic for a particular situation,
and try to determine the scientifically justifiable level
of confidence in the reliability of a particular claim about that
situation.
an application: In an
effort to avoid false generalizations, in the sections below I claim only
that a historical science can produce reliable conclusions [in some
situations for some claims]. I defend this claim because I think
it is true, but I won't defend a claim that seems false, a claim that every
historical science will produce reliable conclusions [in every situation
for every claim]. This page closes by looking at variations in the "justifiable
level of confidence" for different situations and claims.
Operations Science and Historical Science
Yes, historical science
can produce
reliable conclusions.
Earlier, I say that scientific
methods
"vary from one area of science to
another." Some variations in methods are due to differences
between
operations science (to study the
current operation of nature, what is happening now) and
historical
science (to study the previous history of nature, what happened
in the past). Both types of science are similar in most important
ways, especially in their use of scientific logic, but there are minor
differences. { Although some young-earth creationists try to contrast
historical origins
science with
experimental empirical
science (i.e., science based on observations), this is wrong because
historical
origins science IS empirical because it is based on observations. }
Although repeatable
controlled
experiments can be done in operations science, this is not possible
for historical events. Sometimes, the limitations of historical data
provide a reason for caution about conclusions. But this challenge
has inspired scientists to develop methods that reduce the practical impact
of data limitations, and historical sciences — in fields such as
astronomy, radiometric physics, and geology — are authentically scientific.
In historical science, one
way to "reduce the practical impact" is to use repeatable
uncontrolled
experiments to gather data. For example, other pages explain
how observations of many Cepheid stars from many parts of the universe
have shown that all Cepheids have similar properties, allowing them (and
supernovas, which have their own consistencies) to be useful for measuring
astronomical distances. These consistencies let scientists develop
reliable
descriptive theories, which can become
explanatory
theories that usually are related to (and are consistent with) explanatory
theories in operations science.
Prediction & Retroduction, Mechanism & Agency
Because theory-based
inferences are usually called predictions,
the non-scientific meaning of "prediction" can lead to the
mistaken impression that in science a logical inference must be made
before an event occurs. But in historical science the timing
of prediction is not a cause for concern, since a "prediction" (a
logical inference based on a theory) can be logically valid even if
it's made after an event has occurred, or after observations are known in a logical process of retroduction where the goal is to find a theory whose predictions will match known observations. In
historical science, the goal is to describe and explain what did happen,
not predict what will happen. In operations science a
descriptive theory states that "what happened before will happen
again." In historical science a descriptive theory might
predict that "what happened in this situation also happened in
other similar situations," or it might propose only that "this
is what happened."
In some historical situations,
only undirected natural process is involved, and a mechanistic
explanatory theory can provide an adequate description and explanation. In
other situations, "what happens" depends on the decisions and
actions of an agent. This introduces an element of unpredictability,
but a historical detective using scientific reasoning (in forensics, psychology,
sociology, anthropology, archaeology, geology, astronomy, or history) only
has to determine what did occur, not predict what will occur, in a descriptive
theory. And in an agency explanatory theory,
proposing that "agent action was involved" is the scientific
conclusion of a historical detective.
Unobservable Causes of Observable Effects
Can scientists logically
infer the existence of things they cannot observe? Yes, if an unobservable
cause produces observable effects. This
cause-and-effect principle is used in operations science. For example,
even though electrons and ideas cannot be observed, modern theories propose
electrons (in chemistry) and ideas (in psychology). Why? Because
our observations are explained in the most satisfactory way by theories
proposing the existence of unobservable causes (electrons and ideas)
that produce the effects we observe.
Similarly, in historical science
we can logically infer the existence of causes we did not observe, if these
unobserved causes produced effects we can observe. Therefore, when
skeptics ask "Were you there? Did you see it?", they are ignoring
the principle that scientific logic depends mainly on observable effects,
not observable causes. Because of this principle, even if an event
or process was not directly observed, a plausible scientific theory can
propose that the event or process did occur.
An Invitation
to Examine the Evidence
Earlier in the page, I say: "Sometimes
the limitations of historical data provide a reason for caution about conclusions." Sometimes,
however, we have reasons to be confident about conclusions. Therefore, "we
should carefully examine the evidence-and-logic for a particular situation, and
try to determine the scientifically justifiable level of confidence in
the reliability of a particular claim about that situation." When doing this
we should also consider "the big picture" and the logical principle
of multiple independent confirmations when
the evidence-and-logic in a wide variety of situations leads to the same conclusion, and this occurs when we examine the abundant evidence for an old earth and old universe.
The radical relativists — the
postmodern skeptics (and young-earth creationists) who challenge the reliability of science — claim
that in historical science the evidence is always inadequate, so the conclusions
of scientists must be determined by their nonscientific beliefs. Most
scholars, including myself and other members of ASA, think these relativists
are exaggerating the logical difficulties, making mountains out of molehills,
and historical sciences have a solid foundation — the logical evaluation
of empirical evidence — that provides a reliable way to learn about the history of nature and the fascinating
world created by God. We encourage you to explore Origins
Evidence where you can carefully examine a wide range of historical situations
and claims, and you can decide which scientific conclusions deserve the highest
level of confidence.