Science
in Christian PerspectiveScience
in Christian Perspective
The Nature of Man and Scientific
Models of Society
JACK BALSWICK
Department of Sociology
University of Georgia Athens, Georgia 30602
DAWN WARD
Department of Social Science
Trinity College Deerfield, Illinois
From: JASA 28 (December 1976): 181-185.
Most contemporary models of society spring from philosophical positions which are based on the Kantian dilemma. On the one hand certain commonly held models are based upon the positivistic tradition and view man as a determined object to be observed objectively. On the other hand, more recently developed models are based upon phenomenological tradition and view man as an undetermined subject who escapes scientific scrutiny. These models of society are examined in light of a Biblical view of the nature of man and society. Although these models do make some contributions, the positivistically based models fail to take into account man's unique humaness, the phenomenologically based models fail to take into account man's creatureliness, and thus both fail to see man as created in the image of God.
Thomas Hobbes (1947) wondered if it were possible to discover the foundations
of social order in human society. He characterized the "state of
nature"
as one of "continual fear, and danger of violence" and human life as
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." While
contemporary sociologists
are preoccupied with the Hobbesian question of social order, they have for the
most part rejected his view of man in the state of nature being base, brutish
and self-centered. Likewise, most contemporary scientific models of
society assume
a basic order in society. Some leave room for social conflict, but they do not
relate conflict to a model of man which views him as a free agent acting in a
selfcentered way.
Most contemporary models of society have been greatly influenced by
the contrasting
analytic and phenomenological philosophical traditions. These
traditions are variants
of the same basically post-Kantian themes. They both start from
Kant's distinction
between "noumena" and "phenomena"-between things
as they are
in themselves and as they appear in consciousness. Both traditions
rejected Kant's
notion of things-inthemselves; but did not revert to a preKantian
position. Instead,
they dealt with the concept of "things-for-consciousness."
Most significantly,
the analytic tradition has emphasized the objects of consciousness,
while the phenomenologists have emphasized the intentionality of
consciousness.
The primary influence of the analytic movement on the contemporary
social sciences
has been the attempt to apply the logical positivist defense of
reductive analysis
to the methods of sociology and psychology. This has been the ease both among
the hard core behaviorists and among "positivists" in
general. Behaviorism
and structural-functionalism are models of man and society which are based on
the positivistic tradition. In these models man is viewed as a
determined object
to be observed objectively.
On the other hand, more recently developing models of man and society are based
upon the phenomenological tradition. In these models man is viewed as
an undetermined
subject who escapes scientific scrutiny. In this paper these models of man and
society are critically examined in the light of a Biblical view of the nature
of man and society. Then, based on a Biblical view of man, the elements of an
adequate model of society are suggested.
The Nature of Man
An adequate model of society must be based upon a Biblical view of man in which
man is seen as created in the image of God and exists as a distorted image of
Cod. More specifically, as pertains to models
of society, man should be conceived as: (1) an indeterminant being who can in
part behave creatively and spontaneously; (2) a self-conscious being
who is capable
of goal-choosing activity; (3) a being capable of doing evil as well as good,
and (4) a being who is responsible for his own behavior.
To affirm these aspects of the nature of man is not to say that man is not in
a certain sense a product of society. We are not denying Durkheim's claim that
society is a reality sui generis with a nature of its own. However,
men's/women's
actions in society are to a large extent determined by certain basic universal
qualities of human nature. Society is both shaped by and limited in its effect
by these qualities. Man and society are best seen as maintaining
their distinctiveness
in a dialectic relationship, where society is a human product, but nevertheless
an objective reality, and man is a social product, but not only social.
Models of Society
Basic to scientific investigation are either explicit or implicit assumptions
about the phenomena which are being studied. For the last three centuries the
universe has been conceived as a machine, whose movements are precise
and predictable
and which can best be understood in terms of causal sequence. For a time only
man escaped being thought of as part of this great machine, but then, man too
came to be conceived as subject matter which could also he studied according to
this causal model. Although behavioral scientists have not completely agreed in
the extent to which they have assumed a mechanistic position, most have until
recently held to a positivistic or nco-positivistic model of society.
In the past
decade there has been a movement among humanistically oriented social
scientists
toward phenom-enological and existentialist models of man and society.
At the risk of over-generalizing, we will attempt to discuss most contemporary
models of society as either positivistic or phenomenological. Two
additional types
of models of society, conflict and symbolic interactionist, will be discussed
separately due to their uniqueness.
Positivistic Models
The positivistic models of society are generally either causal (mechanistic) or
teleological (functional). In the 1940's George Lundberg popularized the causal
model in sociology with his book Can Science Save Us? Although his
strict positivistic
approach was a minority position, sociologists generally adopted some form of
positivism and saw the method of the physical sciences as their
ideal. Most contemporary
sociologists who continue to assume a causal model of society are behaviorists.
It is ironic that a psychologist, B. F. Skinner, has become the major proponent
of a causal model of society since he began to argue for the application of the
principals of operant conditioning to the societal level. Strict behaviorists
like Skinner deny man's personhood by denying his subjectivity. Man is viewed
as a physical object open to scientific scrutiny and description is in terms of
a causal model. Events external to the individual are said to
determine the behavior
of the individual.
In the 1950's structural-functionalism became the dominating
theoretical perspective
in sociology. Structural-functionalists such as Taleott Parsons, Robert Merton,
and Wilbert Moore offered some moderation in
positivistic methodology. Nevertheless man continued to be viewed as an object
for consciousness in a theoretical sense. In the teleological model
of the functionalists
man as a person was submerged. Man was viewed as a "personality
system"
determined by the "social system." Society became the
determining force
and man the determined object. Dennis Wrong has referred to the functionalist
view of man as the "over socialized conception of man."
The functionalists share three assumptions about man which negate
man's individuality
and conflict with other individuals. First, actors are assumed to have acquired
and internalized certain dispositions, e.g., attitudes, sentiments, and to be
subject to certain institutionalized role expectations. Second,
actors are assumed
to operate according to certain fixed psychological principles, e.g.,
the reinforcement
principle. Third, actors are assumed to share a system of symbols and meanings
which serve as a commonly understood medium of communication for
their interaction.
This is the assumption of "cognitive consensus." These
assumptions have
led to an emphasis on normative behavior or conformity. Man is seen
as a choice-making
creature, but only within the realm of fixed values. Creativity is submerged.
Societal integration is also emphasized, with conflict, deviance, and
change being
seen as results of social disorganization rather than intrinsic
social processes.
These positivistically based models of man and society share common errors from
a Biblical perspective. First, they view man solely as a socially
determined object.
The behaviorists view man as completely determined by his
environment; the functionalists
view man as determined by societal roles, psychological principles,
and a shared
symbolic system. According to the behaviorists the concepts of human
freedom and
choice are an illusion; the functionalists view man as a seeker of
goals determined
by society. Both fall short of a Biblical view of man as a goalchooser. Both views
are also sterile in their attempt to explain human alienation,
conflict, and individual
struggle. Since man is not seen in his unique humanness as having an identity
distinct from society, the problems of alienation, exploitation, and
human conflict
are seen as merely reflections of malfunctions in the environment or
social system.
Although much more could he said of the variance between the
positivistic models
and a Biblical view of man, in short: (1) they fail to conceive of
man as a self-conscious
being who is capable of goal-choosing activity; and (2) they fail to
account for
man's ability to do evil as well as good.
Phenomenological Models
A wave of phenomenologically and existentially based models of man and society
have emerged in the past decade. These models are largely a reaction
to the dehumanizing
effects of the positivistically based models. Rather than focusing on man as an
object for consciousness, they emphasize the intentionality of
individual consciousness
by focusing on the individual as the creator of meaning in a meaningless world.
These phenomenological models include labelling theory (Howard
Becker), ethnomethodology
(Harold GarI inkle), the sociology of the absurd (Lyuam and Scott), the reality
constructionists (Berger and Luckman), and
the neo-symbolic interactionists (Irving Goffman).
These phenomenological models make some valuable contributions to an adequate
model of man and society. They deal with man as man, a subjective
being who behaves
meaningfully. They do not view man as completely socially determined,
but emphasize
man's creativity in the social situation. They also view conflict and
alienation
as prevalent processes.
However, these models also share some fundamental weaknesses which make them at
odds with a Biblical view of man. First, man's nature is viewed as a
social construction.
No ahistorical human nature is posited. Man is free to define and redefine his
nature with no limits. A Biblical view sees man as created in the image of God
and thus having certain intrinsic characteristics which limit his
behavior whether
recognized or not. Human beings in other words are not the sole
producers of their
natures. Even the process of self-determination is carried out within a medium
with its own structure. Second, all systems of belief are considered
to be arbitrary
and socially constructed. In dissolving the Kantian dilemma of
things-in-themselves
and things-for-consciousness, phenornenologists focus entirely on
things-for-consciousness
and deny the independence of the created world.
Objects are not the sole product of symbolic interaction as these
phenomenologists
contend, for even symbolic interaction itself depends upon certain criteria of
meaningful cognitive activity. There are certain rules which must be followed
for any discourse to be meaningful, e.g., the law of non-contradiction. As a result
of these weaknesses, the phenomenological models are guilty of having
lapsed into
an overly subjectivistie position. By viewing all knowledge in the social world
(that of the sociologists included) as merely one arbitrary
perspective, the phenomenologists
have substituted "perspective" for knowledge.
Conflict Models
Most conflict models of society are but a little less positivistic
than behaviorism
or functionalism. However, because they stress conflict, the complete
antithesis
of social integration, they deserve to be discussed separately.
There are presently two dominant conflict models of society: (1) the
dialectical
conflict model, which was inspired by Karl Marx; and (2) the conflict
functionalism
model, which was inspired by Georg Simmel (Turner 1974:90-91). Marx
was an economic
determinist who saw conflict as inevitably arising within an economic
system which
propitiates an unequal distribution of goods. Conflict in economic
interests continues
to be the explanatory springboard from which contemporary Marxist sociologists
begin their analysis of society. Although Simmel, like Marx, viewed conflict as
inevitable in society, he "viewed conflict as a reflection of
more than just
conflict of interest, but also of those arising from hostile
instincts" (Turner
1974:84). Turner states that "Simmel postulated an innate
'hostile impulse'
or 'need for hating and fighting' among the units of organic wholes, although
the instinct was mixed with others for love and affection and was circumscribed
by the force of social relationship" (84). Simmel's conflict
model of society
is built upon a view of man which is very consistent with a Biblical
view of
An adequate model of society must be based upon a Christian view of man in which man is seen as created in the image of God and exists as a distorted image of God. Man and society are best seen as maintaining their distinctiveness in a dialectic relationship.
man. However, the leading contemporary proponent of conflict
functionalism, Lewis Coser, sees the source of conflict as lying "in the unequal distribution
of rewards and in the dissatisfaction of the deprived with such
distribution"
(Turner 1974:110-111).
Contemporary conflict models, whether in the Marxian or Simmelian tradition, or
some combination of each, fail to suggest that the source of social
conflict may
in part reside within the nature of man himself. There are contemporary Marxist
sociologists who do recognize that man is more than just a reflection
of society.
However, it is interesting to note that when one self avowed Marxist, Richard
Lichtman, argues that although the self is social, it is not only
social, he supports
this view by quoting from Simmel and not from Marx (Liehtman 1970:80). Although
conflict models provide an accurate description of society, they do not usually
provide an accurate explanation of this conflict (Heddendorf 1972).
Parenthetically, we would add that not all conflict should be thought
of by Christians
as bad or as resulting from man's sinfulness. We would agree with Marxists who
see value in conflict, especially attempts by oppressed groups in
society to better
their situations.
Symbolic Interactionist Models
Symbolic interactionism stresses that the world of man's experience consists of
objects, where objects obtain meaning imputed through the process of
human social
interaction. An individual also gains a view of himself or his "self"
as an object as he interacts with others. Thus reality is socially constructed
in the process of social interaction, and what is real to the
individual is real
because it is real in its effect upon him. Society can exist and
social organization
is made possible because people share a common symbolically constructed view of
reality.
On the one hand symbolic interaction has been criticized as being
merely a social
behavioristic orientation which provides a positivistic model of
society (Liehtman
1970; Fiehter 1974), and on the other, as an orientation which views society as
consisting of indeterminate actors who are "creative" and
"spontaneous"
(Turner 1974). Lichtman and Fiehter both believe that the principal contributor
to symbolic interaction, George Herbert Mead, taught a social
behaviorism in which
man was explained as merely being a product of society. As Lichtman
states, "For
Mead too, the self disappears. This may be vigorously denied but the truth is
that the self as a self-conscious subject of its own existence is dissolved in
Mead's extreme social behaviorism." Fichter (1972:113), states
that "it
remained for George Herbert Mead to destroy that dis
tinction . . . (the distinction between individual and
social aspects of human beings) ... and to hypothesize (Strauss, 1956:204) that
there is only the social self which is 'essentially a social structure and it
arises in social experience.' " However, these criticisms of Mead should
be balanced by Turner's (1974:180) more generous assessment of
contemporary symbolic interactionism. Turner (1974:180) believes that symbolic interactionism makes
the following three assumptions about the nature of man: "(1) Humans have
the capacity to view themselves as objects and to insert any object
into an interaction
situation. (2) Human actors are therefore not pushed and pulled
around by social
and psychological forces, but are active creators of the world to
which they respond.
(3) Thus, interaction and emergent patterns of social organization can only be
understood by focusing on the capacities of individuals to create symbolically
the world of objects to which they respond." Most contemporary
symbolic interactionists
probably view the self as a product of society, but man as a
possessor of a human
self which is indeterminant and can act creatively or spontaneously once it has
been socially produced.
Elements of An Adequate Model of Society
The main purpose of this paper has been to critically examine the
major existing
models of society in the light of a Biblical view of the nature of
man and society.
All of the examined models have been found wanting in one respect or another.
To attempt to construct a "Biblical" or "Christian" model
of society is not only beyond the limits of this paper, but it is
also an undertaking
which would deservingly be suspected by both secular sociologists and Christian
theologians. We would like instead to conclude more modestly by suggesting some
of the elements which should be included in an adequate model of society.
To be consistent with a Biblical view of the nature of man, an adequate model
of society should include at least the following elements:
(1) Man as capable of creating symbolic meaning
and thus his own view of reality. Much of the emphasis within
symbolic interaction
and in certain of the phenomenological models is consistent with this
statement.
A symbolic interactionist model which stresses that man along with
other men create
symbolic meaning, is more consistent with a Biblical view of man than either a
causal or functional model.
(2) Man as not the sole producer of reality and of
his own nature. Not only do causal and functional models fall short here, but,
for the most part, so do the phenomenological and symbolic interaction models.
Phcnomennlogists view men as the sole producers of their own natures.
To he sure,
they do not make the same mistake as the positivists in viewing man's nature as
a product of society, but they also do not view man as having an
intrinsic nature
which reflects, if in a fallen way, the image of God. Certain
conflict theorists
come close to viewing human nature as intrinsically posited. Lichtman (1970:91)
states that although, "Human nature is not unchanging ... it is false to
hold that there are no lawlike connections among its aspects.
...
It is precisely because there is a lawlike connection among aspects
of human activity
that any kind of fore
sight and planning, including socialist planning, is possible."
Whereas Christians
and Marxists may agree on such things as the existence of an
intrinsic human nature
or an inevitable eschatology, the content of such beliefs are vastly
different.
(3) Man as free to distort reality. The Marxist conflict model is in
obvious agreement
with this statement, as capitalistic and other polarizing economic systems are
seen as creating a "false" consciousness or reality. Within
the phenomenological
model there is no reality to distort; rather, man is "free" to create
his own reality. The inadequacy of the positivistic models usually results in
reality being defined in cultural relativistic terms. Reality is seen
as a product
of society; the individual can "distort reality" or "be out of
touch with reality" only in the sense that he does not share
"reality"
as it is defined by society.
In regards to the "free" in this statement, while phenomenologists do
view man as free (more free to create than to distort reality),
positivists would
offer an environmental explanation for a person's distorting of
societal defined
reality. An adequate model of society would posit an actual reality which man
could distort because of his existing in a state of separation or
alienation from
the God who created that reality.
(4) Man as partially motivated by selfish interests.
It is at this point that all of the models appear to fall short.
While it is true
that conflict theory does stress the inevitability of conflict which arises in
society, it does not offer an at all clear explanation of the conflict arising
out of the motivational aspects of man. In an excellent article on the concept
of man in social science, Fichter (1972:117) states that, "As far as I can
discover, sociologists have no model to explain that man can do evil as well as
good." Fichter continues to observe that although this is viewed
as a weakness
by Dennis Wrong in his own classic article of "the oversociologicalized view
of man," Wrong himself offers no alternative model of the nature of man.
The model of society which takes into account the fact that man can
be motivated
by intrinsic selfish interests has not been constructed.
(5) Man as capable of justifying his selfish behavior
on the basis of his definition of reality. Man is not only capable of selfishly
motivational behavior, but he is also capable of defining reality in such a way
that he does not interpret selfish behavior as selfish. Most of the models take
into account man's ability to structure reality so as to justify behavior. As
discussed under point four, however, most models fail to view man as
the initiator
of this selfish behavior.
In summary, an adequate model of society must understand man as in
need of interdependence
through shared meaning, while at the same time accounting for the pervasiveness
of group conflict. Such a model of society would be consistent with a Biblical
view of man and with the way men interact in society.
REFERENCES
Fichter, Joseph, 1972, "The Concept of Man in Social Science:
Freedom, Values
and Second Nature," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 11,
No. 2 (June), p. 109.121.
Heddendorf, Russell, 1972, "Some Presuppositions of a Christian
Sociology,"
Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September), pp.
110-117.
Hobbes, Thomas, 1947, Leviathan, New York: Macmillan Company;
originally published
in 1651.
Liehtman, Richard, 1970, "Symbolic Interactionism and Social
Reality: Some Marxist Queries," Berkeley Journal of Sociology,
Vol. 15, pp.
75-94.
Strauss, Anselm (ed.), 1956, The Social Psychology of George
Herbert Head. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Turner, Jonathan, 1974, The Structure of Sociological Theory, Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press.