Science in Christian Perspective
Darwin and Contemporary Theological Reflection on the Nature of Man
JOHN C. GIENAPP
Coneordia Senior College
Fort Wayne, Indiana 46825
From: JASA 27
(March 1975):12-17.
I am sorry that I have no 'consolatory view' as to [the] dignity of man: I am content that man will probably advance, and care not much whether we are looked at as mere savages in a remotely distant future.1
So wrote Charles Darwin to Charles Lyell in 1860 and in so doing introduced his
own views on perhaps the most difficult theological issue connected
with the development
of evolutionary views-the question of the nature and dignity of man.
This, of course, was not the only religious or theological question raised by
Darwin's work, The controversies have been extensively explored2 and variously
described. In essence, however, there were three important questions:
the question
of how to interpret the Bible; the question of the role of natural theology in
supporting belief in God; and the question of the nature and dignity of man. Of
these three, it seems to me, the last question was the most
important. This becomes
clear, I think, if we examine each of the questions from the perspective of the
present.
Biblical Interpretation
The first question in which Darwin was embroiled was the question of
the interpretation
of the Bible. After the Reformation, Protestants tended to interpret the Bible
literally-that is, to avoid much of the allegorizing and spiritualizing of
patristic
and medieval exegesis. Moreover, as prose styles during the 17th and
18th centuries
became simpler, emphasizing the narrative or expository content, people tended
to interpret the Bible as similar narrative or exposition. In so
doing they often
failed to see the great cultural distance between the Scriptural
writers and themselves.
As a result, the so-called 'historical books" were treated as
straightforward
narrative and, with a few exceptions, as literally true. Doctrines of
revelation
and inspiration then needed to be elaborated to account for the
special knowledge
that writers of such documents seemed to possess. Darwin's work, of
course, carried
the implication that at least the early chapters of Genesis could not
be literally
and historically true.
Yet Darwin neither initiated criticism of the literal interpretation
of the Scriptures
nor alone caused it to he swept away. Within the sciences the development
of cosmology,
geology, and paleontology had already suggested changes in the interpretation
of the Bible before Darwin's work. Moreover, the gradual extension of
the concept
of a law-bound system of nature made many of the miraculous elements
in the Scriptures
appear dubious. In response to this there had been at least a century of higher
criticism before 1859 aimed at revising the understanding of
Scriptural documents.
In his autobiography Darwin attributes his own doubts about the truth
of Christianity
as much to the impact of higher criticism as to the development of
the evolutionary
theory itself.3 In short, the question of the interpretation of Scripture was
raised by the development of science in general, and by literary
considerations,
which I have not detailed here, not merely by the development of the
evolutionary
theory. All these factors together, especially a better understanding
of the literary
and cultural background of the Biblical documents, induced changes in the way
Scripture is interpreted but they have not at the present time
destroyed theological
claims about the authority of the Scriptures or about their central
message.
Natural Theology
The second religious question seemingly exacerbated by Darwin's work
was the question
of the natural knowledge of God, or natural theology. Natural
theology in England,
based in large measure on the views of the "virtuosi" of
the Scientific Revolution,4 was later shaped by William Paley into
physcio-theology,
a particular
form of the argument from design. Its most important characteristic
with reference
to evolution was that it emphasized adaptation and functional
structure in living
creatures as evidence of the wisdom, power, and benevolence of God. By its lights Darwin's work seemed
"atheistical,"
for in explaining adaptation as the result of random variations and
the operation
of natural selection, Darwinism undermined the foundations of physcio-theology.
Darwin agreed, for he could not see how a natural process which
produced adaptation
through struggle, suffering, and extinction could indicate the benevolence of
God.
There seems to me too much misery in the world [he wrote]. I cannot
persuade myself
that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created
the Ichneumonidac
with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies
of caterpillars,
or that a eat should play with mice. Not believing this, I see no necessity in
the belief that the eye was expressly designed. On the other hand, I
cannot anyhow
be contented to view this wonderful universe, and especially the nature of man,
and to conclude that everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to
look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether
good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance. Not that this
notion of oil satisfies me. I feel most deeply that the whole subject
is too profound
for the human intellect. A dog might as well speculate on the mind of Newton.
Let each man hope and believe what he can.5
It is possible, however, to overemphasize Darwin's challenge to
natural theology.
As Loren Eiseley points out, "Darwin did not destroy the
argument from design.
He destroyed only the watchmaker and the watch....Only a certain kind of design argument
had been
eliminated by Darwin, namely the finalistic one. "6
While Darwin and even more so Huxley felt that the overthrow of physico-theology
rendered discourse about God nearly meaningless,7 their view today seems overly
pessimistic. As James Collins points out, they failed to see that the
Paley position
"falls pitiably short of encompassing all the resources of the philosophy
of God, and hence that it does not deserve to be treated as natural
theology without
qualification."8
The argument from design could be reformulated in a way that appealed to many,
including the Americans Asa Gray and John Fiske, although it then required the
removal of God from a role of active benevolence. In addition, natural theology
could be cast in other forms. Most importantly of all, Christian
tradition could
be cast in neo-orthodox forms that had little dependence on natural theology at
all. Thus Darwin's work, devastating as it was to physico-theology, had a more
modest effect on other types of Christian discourse.
Nature of Man
The third religious or theological question was the question of the nature of
man. This question was particularly troublesome because there was no
obvious Christian
tradition that could provide the basis for an evolutionary, yet orthodox view
of man, Such a position would have to he a new formulation. To many this seemed
impossible. In the first place, the nature and dignity of mats was grounded in
the Biblical accounts of creation and allusions to them.
Theologically formulated,
these accounts led to the doctrine of the imnago del. What separated man from
the animals was that man had been created in a special way in the image of God.
However this image was interpreted, it was difficult to reconcile
with the evolutionary
development
Darwin's work raised three important questions: how to interpret the Bible, the role of natural theology in supporting belief in God, and the nature and dignity of man. The last question was the most important.
of man. As Origen conceived it, the imago dei
consisted of an immortal soul, but an immortal soul that evolved gradually was
philosophical nonsense. Perhaps more commonly the image of God was thought of
as man's humanitas, those things that make him distinctly human, such as his
rationality, his moral
responsibility, and his freedom of will. But if these had developed gradually,
man could hardly he said to have a nature or dignity different from any other
living creature.9 In the second place, orthodox Christianity held man to be a
fallen creature, marked by a perversion of his originally perfect nature. This
too was difficult to conceive of in an evolutionary way. Thus Darwin and most
of his religious opponents would have agreed: if the evolutionary
theory was correct,
there seemed to be no consolatory view of the dignity of man. The
point was emphatically
made in the review of the Descent of Man in the Edinburgh Review of 1871.
Mr. Darwin does not confine his argument to the origin of man's body
from pre-existent
loran; he ventures to carry it into the region of mind, and to
account for man's
spiritual powers by a process of natural selection from rudiments in the lower
animals. It is indeed impossible to overestimate the magnitude of the issue. If
our humanity he merely the natural product of the modified faculties of brutes,
most earnest-minded men will he compelled to give up those motives by
which they
have attempted to live noble arid virtuous lives as founded on a mistake; our
moral sense will turn out to he a mere developed instinct identical
in kind with
those of ants and bees; and the revelation of God to us and the hope
of a future
life, pleasurable daydreams invented for the good of society. If these views be
true, a revolution in thought is imminent, which will shake society
to its foundation,
by destroying the sanctity of the conscience and the religious sense;
for sooner
or later they must find expression in men's lives 10
Darwin did not stress his view of man's origin in the
Origin of Species. But in the Descent of Man, published slightly more than a century ago, Darwin addressed himself to
man's origin.
Darwin's main purpose was to marshal] additional biological evidence that man
was indeed descended from an earlier anthropoid-evidence that would complement
Lyell's Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man and Huxley's Mart's Place
in Nature. In addition, Darwin hoped to show that natural selection (with some
help from sexual selection) could explain nearly everything about
man, including
the gradual development of his mental, moral, emotional, and
religious faculties.
In so doing he developed (partly explicitly and partly implicitly) an
anthropology
that today appears somewhat inconsistent. A necessary corollary of the gradual
development of mail was that man differed only in degree, not in
kind, from other
animals. Thus, according to Darwin, he had no special nature or dignity by virtue of
his origin.
To support the idea of man's gradual evolution Darwin developed shat
he felt were
plausible accounts of mail's intellectual, moral, and religious development. In
the case of intellectual faculties Darwin emphasized mainly the
gradation in mental
powers in various animals to make plausible the idea of development.
If no organic being excepting man had possessed any mental power, or
if his powers
had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we
should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had
been gradually developed. But it can be shown that there is no
fundamental difference
of this kind. We must admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power
between one of the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one
of the higher
apes, than between an ape and man; yet this interval is filled up by numberless
gradations.11
Darwin went on to enumerate various mental faculties, such as
imagination, curiosity,
reason, and to give examples of animals supposedly exhibiting these traits.
The development of the moral sense, which Darwin seemed to regard as the chief
attribute of man, presented Darwin with peculiar difficulties. Darwin seemed to
think that man's social instincts coupled with his superior intelligence would
lead to higher morality.
It must not he forgotten [Darwin wrote] that although a high standard
of morality
gives . slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the
other own of the same tribe, yet ... an increase in the number of well-endowed
men and an advancement in the standard of Morality will certainly
give an immense
advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe including many mrnsbers who from
possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity,
obedience, courage,
and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves
for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would
he natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted
other tribes; and as morality is one important element in their
success, the standard
of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere
tend to rise
and increase ... Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear that
the social instinct will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous
habits will
grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle
between our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue will be
triumphant.12
The difficulties with this view become apparent when one tries it in any known
historical context. One hardly thinks of the European supplanting the American
Indian because of his higher degree of patriotism, fidelity,
obedience, courage,
and sympathy. Studies of animal behavior suggest that aggression and a killer
instinct may he selected for as well as "virtue." Darwin's difficulty
was that he operated with moral categories not grounded in the
evolutionary process.
If man indeed has no special nature or dignity apart from the animals, how can
lie he said to he in struggle-his higher nature against his lower? Darwin, it
seems, retained some contemporary values without realizing their conflict with
his evolutionary anthropology.
Development of Religion
In his discussion of the development of religion
Darwin encountered similar difficulty. As an anthropologist he could place the
origin of religion in the dreams and superstitions of primitive people; and he
could suggest how these led to other beliefs: fetishism, polytheism,
and various
superstitions and customs. But he also described the belief in a universal and
beneficent Creator arising in "high" cultures. In addition
he said "the
question of whether there exists a Creator and Euler of the universe has been
answered in the affirmative by some of the highest intellects that
have ever existed."
But on what criteria did Darwin know that the intellect that affirms a Creator
is higher? Certainly not because of the actual existence of a
Creator, since his
own ideas seemed to cast doubt on the existence of God. As he said, "the
horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind,
which has been
developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at
all trustworthy.
Would anyone trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there
are any convictions
in such a mind?" Here, too, Darwin seemed to have accepted
values that were
not grounded in the evolutionary process as he elsewhere described it.
There was no obvious Christian tradition that could provide the basis for an evolutionary, yet orthodox view of man.
Besides the idea that man differs only in degree from animals, Darwin's anthropology contained a second assertion-the assertion of universal human progress. "I am content that man will probably advance and care not much whether we are looked at as mere savages in a remotely distant future," Darwin wrote to Lye]]. He echoed this view in the Descent of Man.
Man may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead of having been aboriginally placed there, may give him hope for a still higher destiny in the distant future. 13
Darwin faced a similar problem with the concept of progress as he did
in his discussion
of human morality. There was nothing in the evolutionary theory
itself that required
progress of the sort that Darwin envisioned. In fact, he felt that the ultimate
disappearance of man, which his view of nature implied, was intolerable.
Believing as I do that man in the distant future will be a far more
perfect creature
than lie now is, it is an intolerable thought that lie and all other sentient
beings are doomed to complete annihilation after such long
continued slow progress.14
If the evolutionary process is a matter of randotn variations,
natural selection,
and increasing adaptation, and if it involves specialization, and
often over-specialization
and extinction, then, bow can one determine whether man really is the line on
which the evolutionary future depends? Darwin never conceived of the
possibilities
we know today, that man can easily cause his own extinction, that the history
of the human race, instead of being a glorious pathway to the future, may be simply a cruel
hoax of nature, an evolutionary blind alley.
In short, Darwin made a strong case for the evolutionary origin of
man. The balance
of probability now
lay heavily with the idea that man had developed slowly long ago from
a precursor
anthropoid form. However, if man was only different in degree from the animals,
as Darwin argued, then Darwin had no easy way to sustain the goodness
of the moral
values he advocated or the truthfulness of the knowledge he asserted. Even more
difficult to support was his confident belief that the evolutionary process led
to human progress-that higher cultures emerged and supplanted lower ones while
morality was everywhere on the rise. Finally, Darwin had little
concern for what
the Christian tradition has called evil or sin-the capability of man to pervert
his own nature and destroy himself and his society. Thus Darwin's anthropology
presented several puzzles to theologians. If it was in fact true that there was
direction to the evolutionary process, then exactly how was this progress to he
understood in a theological sense? And how was the nature of man to
be understood
if it was in fact changing? How was man related to Cod, if not by
direct creation
and subsequent fall? What meaning, if any, was there in the
traditional doctrine
of sin?
Contemporary theological traditions have not all agreed that these
are valid questions.
Two contemporary theological traditions that have addressed themselves to these
questions are process theology and the theology of the future.
Process Theology
Process theology takes as its starting point the metaphysical system of Alfred
North \Vhitehead. In Vhitehead's system reality is one universal
process systematically
governed, according to certain laws, by a cosmic mind or Cod. While God in his
primordial nature is unchanging and complete, the source of all ideals and new
possibilities, God in his consequent nature, as Whitehead describes it, shares
in the creative advance of the world. The world is not mere flux and
change, because
somehow God is the ground of all becoming and moves toward greater and greater
integration with his primordial nature. Religion is the vehicle by
which men get
some understanding of the direction of this process, although their
understanding
of it will never he complete.
Besides the idea that man differs only in degree from animals, Darwin's anthropology contained a second assertion-the assertion of universal human progress.
Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within,
the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real,
and yet waiting
to he realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest
of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes,
and yet eludes
apprehension; something whose possession is the final goon, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the
hopeless quest.15
Whitehead's system gives a good account of the evolutionary process
and indicates
a kind of progress in it. However, even some of his most sympathetic
interpreters
admit that Whitehead had very little to contribute to the understanding of the
nature of man. Thus theologians within the process tradition have attempted to
elaborate Whitehead's philosophy to incorporate facets of Christian
anthropology.
John B. Cobb, for example, has attempted to show that two Christian doctrines,
namely the doctrine that man is a responsible sinner and the doctrine
that personal
existence continues beyond this life, can be incorporated into a Whiteheadian
scheme, The doctrine of man as a responsible sinner is vulnerable to
scientific-philosophical
criticism on two counts, Cobb says. On the one hand, if man is
completely determined
by natural forces, to talk of his responsibility is meaningless. On the other
hand, if there is no objective claim upon man to terms of which right and wrong
can be defined, it is equally meaningless. In response to the first criticism
Cobb argues that Whitehead's concept of freedom permits the understanding that
man has freedom "within the context of cumulative individual and
social relations,"
thereby retaining the view that men cannot escape the causal nexus.
The objectivity
of moral standards can also be maintained within a Whiteheadian
scheme, Cobb asserts.
Such a formulation, he feels, is in fact preferable to Kantian or
existentialist
formulations. We shall not here detail Cobb's view on personal existence after
death.16 However, it can he seen that Cobb attempts to develop an anthropology
that is traditionally Christian in accepting the reality of man as sinner. What
is less clear is how Cobb would integrate traditional redemptive and
Christologieal
elements into his scheme.
Another process theologian who deals with the question of man's
nature is Daniel
Day' Williams. In his book The Spirit and the Forms of Love, he makes
full-length
interpretation of the concept of love based to a large extent on the categories
of process thought. Its so doing, he discusses the traditional concept of the imago dei
in man. According to Williams the bongo (lei in man is not
all ontological
quality; it is a relationship. It must he conceived "in dynamic terms as
the relatedness which God has established between himself and man and to which
man can respond." In Williams' view
the imago dei should not he conceived as a special quality, hot as
the relationship
for which man is created with his neighbor before God. The image of
God is reflected
its every aspect of man's being, not as a special entity, but as the meaning
of the life of man in its essential integrity. But surely this can
be most clearly
grasped it we say that love is the meaning of the imago dei. 17
By describing the concept of the ioiogo dci in this way Williams call
easily formulate
a concept of sin. "The root of sin is the failure to realize
life is love."
Williams can then provide an analysis to correlate his position with
traditional
doctrines about the sinfulness of man without, however, resorting to a concept
of a historical fall. Willianis admits that his view of the imago dci
as a relationship
is not new or unique to him, but he asserts:
the process theology which informs our interpretations of the Christian faith
proposes a distinctive addition to the doctrine (of the image of
God), for process
theology sees love disclosed in a history in which the spirit of God
creates new
forms. In this history God is involved with the world both as its
eternal ground
and as the supreme participant in the suffering which his creativity involves.
In process theology therefore the 'analogy of being' which holds
between God and
the creatures must be related to a fully historical conception of wlsat being
is. Man bears the image of Cod in his temporality as well as his participation
in eternity, in suffering as well as in peace. His loves are in prqeess.18
From this conception of human nature set in the image of God, Williams is able
to make a strong plea for ethical behavior and for social action. Man himself
ought to live out the purposes of God and in so doing his nature and
his society
will change, as it "participates in the infinite life of communion within
the everlasting creativity of God.19
In summary, the process theologians have been able to give a view of man that
sets him within an evolutionary framework and yet grounds that framework upon
a concept of God, albeit not a very traditional concept of God. In
addition, they
have argued for many of the traditional anthropological doctrines
within Christianity,
the imago dci, man's responsibility for sin, and the moral claims
upon him, while
rejecting the ontological categories and (circular) urzeitendzeit typology in
which these were traditionally expressed.
Theology of the Future
Another contemporary theological movement that has attempted to
express Christian
faith in categories that are evolutionary is the theology of the
future-a theology
that has ties with the Marxian philosophy of Erisst Bloeh. Bloch's philosophy
develops an ontology of the future. "It is only the horizon of
the future,"
he suggests, which gives to reality its real dimension." A thing
is not what
it is, but what it will be, To be human then is to have a utopia, to
be in hope,
ahead of oneself, to he in quest of one's essence to establish it in
the future.
Bloch, however, does not expect the future to he eschatological in
any traditional
Christian sense. According to Carl Braaten, one of Bloch's American interpreters, Bloeh demythologizes the eschatological myths of messianic religion. "Man," Bloch says, "is the
God of Christianity, and anthropology is the secret of Christian
theology. "20
In spite of the anti-theological tone of Bloch's philosophy some
theologians have
found the category of the future exceptionally useful in illuminating
the eschatological
content of Christian faith. Drawing on Biblical material they have emphasized
in the Hellsgesc/siehte of Israel and the Christian Church the continual cycle
of promise and fulfillment in which the fulfillment gives new dimcnsioss to the
promise and foreshadows in turn further events. The process is grounded in the
nature of God himself who continually make all things new. As Jurgeo Moltmann
says,
God is the power of the future and is heliesr'd in as the creator of
a new world.
Out of this qualitatively new future, new power already forces its way into the
present so that man can find possibilities for rebirth and renewal,
personal and
revolutionary social change. We are confronted here with an escathatologically
oriented faith. It is not interested in an event that took place at the
beginning of time or in explaining why the world exists and why it is as it is.
It wants to change the world rather than explain it, to transform
existence rather
than elucidate it.21
Thus the theology of the future, while not in explicit dialogue with
Darwin, has
taken up the claim of progress and attempted to ground it on a wholly different
level. There is a direction to nature and to butnan history not because laws of
nature determine it, not because the evolutionary structure of the
cosmos is inherently
creative, but because God continually creates things anew.
Anthropology within the theology of the future is explicated by
Wolfhart Pannenberg
in his book Was ist dcr Mcnsch? According to Pannenberg, the characteristic of
man-that which makes him really man, which distinguishes him from animals, and
lifts him out above non-human nature in general-is his "openness
to the world."
Mass has a world that can take an almost infinite variety of forms, rather than
a mere environment like animals. Man transforms his world from a natural world
to a world of culture, but he is never satisfied with it; he is
always searching
for something beyond. Urged ms by a multiplicity of drives, he
relentlessly seeks
to master nature and the world of his own making, and then to inquire beyond.
The reason for this, Pannenberg argues, is that man's "openness
to the world"
presupposes a relation to God. "The necessity that man inquire
beyond everything
that he comes across as his world. . . is understandable only as the question
about Cod." "What the environment is for animals, God is for man. God
is the goal in which alone his striving can find rest and his destiny
be fulfilled."22
Pannenberg here picks up a thrust in evolutionary anthropology-that
man must ask
about his destiny; indeed, more than that, that man must shape it-and suggests
that ultimately the shape of that destiny can only be discovered in God.
Pannenberg deals with the traditional Christian doctrine of sin by saying that
man's nature as "openness to the world" can he contradicted
by self-centeredness.
In fact, man constantly lapses into selfcenteredness. He cannot by
himself solve
the conflict between openness to the world" and
self-centeredness. Here Pannenberg
would probably take issue with Darwin's confident belief that moral virtues and
hence man's nature are constantly improving. According to Pannenberg,
it is only
beyond death that the conflict between self-centeredness and openness
to the world
call he overcome. For Pannenberg the Christian tradition mediates
this life beyond
death in the union of believers in the death and life of Jesus Christ.
Pannenberg sees both individual destiny and the destiny of the human
race as something
that can never he adequately fulfilled or disclosed within the world as we know
it. It will only be fulfilled when the world is transformed. This cannot come
about of itself; it can he effected only by God. The Christian hope that such
a transformation will take place is grounded in action that Cud has
already taken
in the historical person of Jesus. "The unity of history as it
is established
in Jesus' fate niakes it possible for each individual to attain the wholeness
of his own life by knowing that he, together with all men, is related to that
center. "23
Pannenherg's anthropology is an attempt to deal seriously with man's possibilities for changing his future -with
man's progress,
as Darwin might put it. He has moved away from the traditional expressions of
Christian anthropology that talk of a perfect beginning, a fall into sin, and
an ultimate restoration to perfection. Yet he retains the traditional Christian
concept of the radical sinfulness of man in his assertion that man
cannot by any
of his own powers overcome the conflict between his self-centeredness and his
'openness to the world." Furthermore, he maintains a traditional Christian
position in asserting that change in destiny (of a much more profound sort than
Darwin described in his suggestions of moral improvement) comes only
at the initiative
of God, an initiative that Pannenberg grounds Christologically.
Summary
What I have tried to show here is that of the three religious
questions connected
with Darwinism, the question of the nature and destiny of man was the
one on which Darwinisn had the greatest effect. The positive findings associated with the
evolutionary theory required changes in the formulations of Christian
anthropology,
if the Christian doctrines of sin and redemption were to he related
to an evolving
human nature. But beyond that, the difficult claim of individual and
social progress
required attention. Darwin's formulation of the claim was not profound, but the
idea persisted. Process theology and the theology of hope each
attempt to ground
progress in the nature of God; each in its own way attempts to
understand traditional
Christian anthropology in a framework in which man is continually
changing. Each
requires a philosophical framework developed in the post-Darwinian era.
The question remains whether these are "consolatory views," whether
they are improvements on Darwin's strange blend of scepticism about
human dignity
and naively confident belief in human progress. Certainly they
provide religious
alternatives to Darwin's view, grounding human nature in its
relationship to God,
without denying some of Darwin's insights. Whether they are views that satisfy
men deeply cannot now he answered; that answer can only he estimated
in the future
by the power of these views to move men to highest human actions.
Ultimately the
question of human nature will puzzle men until that hoino novus, that new man,
anticipated each in its own way by both Christian tradition and
evolutionary biology,
is fully formed.
Two contemporary theological traditions that have addressed themselves to these questions are process theology and the theology of the future.
REFERENCES
lAs quoted in John Greene, The Death of Adam (Ames: Iowa State
University Press,
1959), p. 308.
2A handy bibliography, although by no means complete, is in Evolution
and Religion,
ed. Gail Kennedy (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1957).
3Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809-1882 with
Original Omissions
Restored (New York: liarcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), pp. 85-86.
4See Richard Westfall, Science and Religion in Seventeenth Century England (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).
5Charles Darwin, Life and Letters (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1888), 11,
105.
6Loren Eiseley, Darwin's Century (Garden City Anchor Books, 1961), p. 197.
7See, for example, T. H. Huxley, Collected Essays (New York: D.
Appleton &
Co., 1917), IX, 147.
8James Callios, "Darwin's Impact on Philosophy," Thought,
XXXIV (1959), 188.
91 am indebted to unpublished work of my colleague, Prof. James Childs, Jr.,
for a taxonomy of the concept of the imago dei.
10Edinburgh Review, CXXXIV (1871), 195.
11Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (New York: Modern Library Edition,
nd.),
p. 445.
12Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man in Relation to Sex, new edition,
revised and
augmented (New York: Appleton, 1886), p. 145-6.
13Darwin, Descent of Man, Modern Library Edition, p. 920.
l4Charles Darwin, Autobiography with Omissions Restored, p.
15N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press
Paperback, 1967),
pp. 191-2.
16John B. Cobb, Jr., "Whitehead's Philosophy and a Christian Doctrine of
Man," Journal of Bible and Religion, XXXII (1964), pp. 209-220.
17Daoiel D. Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Lace (New York:
Harper and Bow,
1968), p. 134.
18Williams, p. 135.
19Williams, p. 138.
20The above is drawn from Carl Braateo, "Ernst Bloch's
Philosophy of Hope,"
The Futurist Option, ed. by Carl Braaten and Robert Jensen (New York:
Newman Press,
1970), 59-78.
2lJurgen Moltmann, "What is 'New' in Christianity," Religion,
Revolution and the Future, trans. by Douglas Meeks (New York:
Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1969), p. 5.
22Wolfhart Paonenberg, What is Man, trans. by Duane A. Priebe
(Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1970). p. 12f.
23Pannenherg, p. 149.