Science in Christian Perspective
A Commentary On Being Sane in Insane Places
Social Criticism and Scientific Responsibility
E. MANSELL PATTISON
Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior
University of California,
Irvine and
Deputy Director, Training Orange County Department of Mental Health
California
From: JASA 26 (September 1974): 110-114.
A recent highly publicized article in Science magazine takes a broad
swiping attack
on the mental health system. This article presents a technical analysis of the
author's research, The analysis suggests that the author's
conclusions are unrelated
to his research as reported. However, evidence is presented to suggest that the
author used his research material as an occasion to present a trenchant social
criticism. The covert and unlabelled combination of social criticism
in conjunction
with and under the label of empirical scientific study is brought
under question.
This method of publication is potentially dangerous to the
intellectual autonomy
of science, and undercuts the recognition of moral responsibility for
social criticism
as a human venture.
Introduction
An interesting, perplexing, and disturbing event occurred in the spring of 1973
that raises some basic issues in terms of scientific responsibility.
A long major
article was published in the January 19th issue of Science, on the
topic of psychiatric
diagnosis in mental hospitals, with the intriguing title, "On being sane
in insane places".11 Simply put, the author described a
series of experiments
in which eight subjects gained admission to twelve psychiatric
facilities by requesting
admission with a presenting complaint of bizzare hallucinations. In
each instance
the subject presented himself in the role of a psychotically disturbed patient,
was admitted, received a psychotic diagnosis, was observed for several days on
a ward, had his ease reviewed by staff, and subsequently was
discharged as a case
of psychosis in remission.
The author admits that this sequence of events is not particularly surprising,
although this admission comes in his subsequent rebuttal to letters
to the editor
some months later. The author says: "The issue is not that the
pseudopatient
lied. Of course he did. Nor is it that the psychiatrist believed him. Of course
he must believe him. Neither . . . whether admitted
(which) was the only humane thing to do."12 So what is at issue,
that should
stir an article written and presented in stirring polemic fashion? According to
the author it is simply: "the diagnostic leap between the single
presenting
symptom . . . and the diagnosis."
To those outside the field of psychiatry this might seem like a topic
hardly scintillating
enough to stir controversy. And indeed within the field of psychiatry
this issue
has been the topic of many sober studies. So we are left wondering
why the sensationalistic
publication in a general journal such as Science?
Before attempting some speculations and reflections, I should like to present
a brief critique of the research methodology and conclusions of this study from
the standpoint of empirical research. Although this may be a bit technical for
the reader, I wish to illustrate
the serious methodological, conceptual, and logical flaws of the
author's report.
A Critique of Method
The recent article by D. L. Rosenhan, "On Being Sane in Insane
Places",
has received widespread notice in the public press. These reports proclaim that
psychiatrists are unable to differentiate normal persons from those suffering
from severe emotional disorders, thus implying serious question as to
scientific
procedure and professional competency. The fact that the press may
have sensationalized
this report does not negate the fact that Rosenhan has published a
very ambiguous
piece of research that is open to serious scientific criticism.
The exact intent of the Rosenhan research is impossible to divine, for he makes
allusion to just about every major issue in the mental health field with a lick
and a promise. Yet an adequate rejoinder would have to deal with several major
conceptual issues that Rosenhan never clearly delimits as arenas for
discourse.
Moreover, his scientific methodology is open to serious question. He does not
test his alleged major hypothesis, his methodolgy is irrelevant to
the test question,
and his data are tangential to his hypothesis. Therefore his
conclusions can only
be taken as assertions of his opinion, rather than tenable interpretations of
his data.
Does Rosenhan present new findings? We must answer, no. To begin at the ending,
I have no cavil with the observations and experiences reported by Rosenhan and
his colleagues. In fact, I would strongly validate the reality and
pervasiveness
of many such hospital situations. But he describes nothing new. His
observations
are already immortalized in the work of his fellow Stanford
colleague, Ken Kesey,
who authored the best seller, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, which became a
sell-out theatrical production. For those not familiar with the story (based on
Kesey's experience as a ward attendant), a basically sane hero
attempts to organize
the psychotic patients on a hospital ward to oppose the malignant behavior of
the treatment staff. Our sane hero is promptly diagnosed as a
trouble-making psychotic
who is eventually therapized to literal death. Thus the fact that sane persons
can be labelled and treated in insane fashions has entered the common knowledge
of public domain.
Does his work possibly lead to new solutions? Again we must answer,
no. Rosenhan
calls for more research. Yet the social psychology of mental institutions has
been a major field for over twenty years. We have known what Rosenhan describes
in exquisite theoretical and practical detail for over a decade. But he ignores
the psychology of institutional change. Knowledge, per se, does not
produce change.
The ultimate irony of this regards Goffman. His classic research on
total institutions
was conducted at a famous hospital. When I interviewed staff at that hospital
some ten years after Goffman, most knew of his book, most did not know it was
a study of their hospital, and nothing had changed in the hospital in ten years
post-Goffman.
Rosenhan suggests that if we do not send people to insane places, our
impressions
of them are likely to be less distorted. Here he assumes that
psychiatric hospital
units are inevitably bound to a gross distortion process. That is an assumption
that can be empirically
Rosenhan has published ("On Being Sane in Insane Places") a very ambiguous piece of research that is open to serious scientific criticism.
tested. There is abundant evidence to indicate that organizational
change is possible
to redress the distortions Rosenhan describes.13
The Rosenhan alternative is to retain disturbed persons in their community for
treatment, because their community is a non-pejorative environment. His support
for community treatment programs is certainly consonant with our
theoretical and
therapeutic concepts of the day, but his rationale is not supported by evidence
that the community is non-pejorative. The disturbed or deviant person
is not labelled
as such after he comes to the psychiatric hospital, but rather before he comes
to the hospital.6,14
Furthermore, the whole community treatment process in the community
is not devoid
of labelling and social role assignment.2,9 It is only more covert, and thereby
might even be more noxious. I am not arguing in support of the sad
state of affairs
in many psychiatric hospitals. But we will not escape the same
labelling and dehumanizing
processes by merely moving into the community.2 For example, Cumming1 has done
a brilliant social role analysis of the total human services system
in a community
which demonstrates the same phenomena Rosenhan describes in the hospital.
Does he formally test a hypothesis? For the third time we must answer, no. This
leads us hack to the central thesis of the Rosenhan piece. The stated
hypothesis
to be tested is one of clinical judgment. Can the psychiatric
clinician distinguish-I
cannot finish the sentence. Roseohan never states a clean hypothesis. Nor does
he state which variables he intends to deal with in his research on
clinical judgment.
Harty4 proposes five classes of variables involved in the assessment
of clinical
judgment:
1. The nature of the judgment task; type of judgment
required, and response alternative open to the judge.
2. The nature of the input which provides the judge
with his data.
3. Characteristics of the judge which enter into the
process; the types of cognitive operations performed,
and individual
traits which
affect these operations.
4. The nature of the context in which judgments are
made.
5. Interactions among these classes of variables.
In terms of the first variable, Rosenhan fails to specify the nature
of the judgment
task. He uses terms such as sanity (a legal term), mental illness (a
term of social
convention), and schizophrenia (a technical diagnostic term) as synonyms. Then
normality is thrown in-a notoriously ambiguous term-along with the
issues of cross-cultural
norms.
A careful reading reveals that a judgment is being required that Rosenhan does
not specify. The task is this: Will judges (hospital staff) agree
with a self-definition
of the psychiatric patient role, and thereafter continue to judge the person in
a consistent fashion according to the initial labelling definition
despite contradictory
behavioral and intellectual data?
Thus his study turns out to be research on role
behavior, not research on clinical diagnostic decision
making. Central to role theory is the process of role
assumption and role-assignment. The data reveal that his subjects
enter a role-assuming
pose and receive congruent role-assignment. They claim to be patients, and in
turn they are accepted and treated as patients. These are recurrent distressing
data, but not novel findings. The research data do present some provoca
tive questions related to role-theory (not clinical diagnosis). For
example, what
social characteristics lead to role assignment on the basis of
inadequate and/or
inappropriate data? Or, what types of data must be introduced into the social
transactional world to change role assignments, etc?
Although Rosenhan is dealing with role theory and labelling theory, he fails to
relate his research at either a theoretical or applied level to the corpus of
relevant research in medical sociology.
Rosenhan fails to provide substantive data on variables 2. and 3. while he does
dwell on variable 4. and ignores variable 5.
Nor does he deal with any of the relevant empirical studies that deal
with variables
2. and 3. For example, Gauron & Dickinson3 have shown that
cognitive closure
may lead to a diagnostic label unrelated to substantive data input.
On the other
hand, when one deals with scientifically competent judges, a high
level of validity
and reliability can be obtained on clinical psychiatric judgments.5,15
Reasons for diagnostic disagreement have been summarized by Ward, et al.9
A. Inconstancy on the part of the patient: 5%
B. Inconstancy on the part of the
diagnostician: 32.5%
C. Inadequacies of the nosology: 62.5%
It is clear that diagnostic problems reside primarily in the issues
of theoretical
constructs, rather than the ability to accurately observe and make
clinical deductions.
Rosenhan deals with none of this research, nor any of the conceptual
issues involved.
If his research were a study of clinical diagnostic judgment, then it would be
incumbent upon him to propose some rationale for the fact that his conclusions
are totally opposite to the empirical research in the field. But in
fact, he has
not conducted a study on clinical judgment, and therefore his
conclusions in regard
to the failure in psychiatric judgment are irrelevant.
This is the central theoretical issue at stake. For the distinction
must be made
between the scientific capacity to make reliable and valid clinical deductions
resulting in a conceptual diagnosis, versus the use of diagnostic labels in the
service of social role transactions.
It is possible to construct a research methodology that would address
the stated
hypothesis. Subjects could he presented to a panel of judges apart
from the social
role transactions of a treatment setting. Then we would study whether
the judges
could differentiate between those subjects who claimed to be
emotionally disturbed
but were not (the pseudo-psychotic, if you will) and those who were
in actuality
emotionally disturbed. Of course, this purely experimental situation does not
address a second theoretical issue,
namely, how do social, cultural, contextual, and transactional
variables influence
the processes of data collection and data evaluation. Here one would perforce
deal with a complex matrix of interactive variables, requiring a
quasi-experimental
multi-matrix methodology.
These issues are by no means academic, for in many clinical settings,
most notably
in forensic psychiatry, the psychiatric clinician is requested to differentiate
between feigned illness and actual illness. From personal clinical experience
this is often a vexing problem if one approaches the task with
scientific objectivity.
For example, the Ganser syndrome allegedly describes a person,
usually in a legal
setting, who claims mental illness to avoid legal penalties. The long history
of controversy about this syndrome illustrates the difficulty
involved in assessing
a person in that social role. Thus the questions which Rosenhan raises are by
no means trivial. One possible argument might be that social role
assumption and
role ascription are central variables in any assessment of a person.
As one thinks
he is, so he is. Which immediately leads us into issues of
phenomenology and philosophy
as Rosenhan hints.
Inhumane institutional practices in part reflect the demands and expectations of society.
As the Rosenhan report exists, it suggests that the problems lie
solely with the
mental health professions and psychiatric institutions. However, institutions
and professional practice exist in reciprocal relation to public attitudes and
public demands. Inhumane institutional practices in part reflect the
demands and
expectations of the society. The rejection and dehumanizing of the psychiatric
patient within the institution can be seen as a projection and acting
out of the
community rejection and dehumanization of the labelled deviant.1,2,8
However, solutions do not come from blaming the public, the institution, nor a
profession. For blame demands punishment. And while punishment may appease it
will not necessarily produce change. Our humanistic desire for
fundamental changes
in our response to deviant behavior requires that we not be defensive
nor protectionistie
about basic problems in our society, institutions, and professions.9 Therefore,
the conclusions and recommendations that Rosenhan proposes miss the
central issues
and end up as seapegoating observations rather than as catalytic clarification.
In my opinion, Rosenhan ends up doing what he decries. He labels
behavior instead
of conducting an accurate assessment.
Implicit Social Criticism
Having stated my critique, I return to the author's assertion that
his study was
merely a piece of research on the diagnostic leap from single symptom
to diagnosis.
If the critique I have made has validity, we must conclude that Rosenhan either
engaged in some incredibly sloppy research in which his conclusions were
unrelated to and unsubstantiated by his research data; or that he
ignored a substantial
body of research that totally contradicts his method and conclusions; or that
he had other purposes in mind, not reflected in his stated research aim.
Inasmuch as Rosenhan is a respected scholar who has published well
known material,
it seems implausible that he would tolerate uncritical research or
ignore substantive
research publications relevant to his work. On the other hand, there
are several
indications that Rosenhan may have had other implicit goals in mind
in his publication.
First, he presents simplistic attacks on every complex issue in mental health
in his original article. Why attack every issue-with no suggestions
or discussion,
in a research article? Second, he concludes that mental hospitals are bad and
should be abolished. Granted the deplorable state of some institutions, why the
desire to throw the baby out with the bathwater? Third, he repeatedly attacks
psychiatrists for being presumptuous, or at least disdainful of
scientific data.
This is the facet of psychiatric research data directly relevant to
his research.
Who is he attacking? These are observations on the implicit tone of
his article.
In his subsequent rebuttal to letters, he comes more directly to his implicit
concerns. Basically, he is concerned about how we study man. To his
mind man can
be studied only in terms of objective external tests and measures.
What man says
and does-man's testimony of himself does not constitute scientific reliable and
valid data. Rosenhan says: ". . . (diagnosis)
is not independently verifiable beyond what a patient says and does. "12
Thus Rosenhan is back arguing a type of Logical Positivism philosophy. He wants
a laboratory operational approach to the study of man.
I suppose this approach to the study of man might fall under the now
popular category
of behaviorism. One need not quarrel with Rosenhan for taking this
position, which
is certainly a tenable way to study man, albeit only one view of man. But since
this argument is an old one, argued many times in the psychological literature,
why should Rosenhan raise this issue in such a covert and tangential
manner?
Should social criticism and empirical research be combined? . . It seems most necessary that we do not subvert scientific research and publication as propaganda for a social position.
Let us pursue the matter one step further. He is opposed to the use
of psychiatric
diagnosis. Ostensibly because it is scientifically inaccurate and
based on subjective
patient self-reports rather than objective laboratory data. But why
are psychiatric
diagnoses disturbing to him? In his original article he states:
"Psychological
suffering exists. But normality and abnormality, sanity and insanity, and the
diagnoses that flow from them may be less substantive than many believe them to
be." This quote may not seem very clear, and Rosenhan does not exegete his
concerns that flow from the use of diagnostic labels, But I should like to suggest some issues currently in
hot debate in our society which I believe Rosenhan ultimately wishes
to address.
(1) There is the real concern about the potential role of the psychiatrist as
an agent for political social control. Recent cases in Russia suggest
that political
foes have been declared insane and imprisoned in psychiatric
hospitals as pseudo-patients.
Such allegations have not been fully investigated, but it raises
similar concerns
in our American society.
(2) Over the past ten years there has been increasing
concern for the civil rights and civil liberties of the patient admitted to a
psychiatric facility. A joint task force of the American Bar
Association and the
American Psychiatric Association met to draft model legal code
revisions for admission
procedures and civil rights of hospitalized patients. Many states
have since adopted
versions of this model legislation, although there are continuing inequities in
many parts of the country. (3) The liberation movements of the 1960's
were reflected
in a "radical left" movement in American psychiatry, led by
Thomas Szasz
in America and Ronald D. Laing in England. In effect they proclaimed
the "myth
of mental illness". To them and others in the movement, mental illness was
the product of social oppression. Thus society was sick and made
unrealistic demands
for conformity, or labelled those who deviated from traditional
social convention
as "mentally ill" in order to control them. This position
has been joined
by certain sociologists such as Thomas Scheff, who argue for a social
role theory
of mental illness. In brief, these sociologists argue that mental
illness is nothing
more than a deviant social role created by society. The radical left therefore
demands the elimination of psychiatric diagnoses because such
diagnoses are means
of social manipulation that hurt people.
In this light we can see that Roscnhan's concern
for psychiatric diagnosis fits with a certain zeitgeist.
He is raising an argument, in line with other social critics, of the possible
social misuses and abuses of the mental health system in society. At this point
I can now note that Rosenhan is not only a psychologist, but is a law
professor.
This is potentially significant in that lawyers take a leading role in much of
the social criticism
I have alluded to. These admittedly loosely connected observations, taken as a
whole, suggest that Rosenhan is not concerned with a narrow research question
on psychiatric diagnostic method, but rather is assuming the role of a social
critic.
Now it should he stated that in my opinion there is considerable
reason for concern
in each of the three areas of social criticism outlined above. Thus one cannot
fault Rosenhan for being a social critic, nor can we fault him for
raising issues
relevant to any of these social concerns. But if my major thesis
stands, namely,
that Rosenhan has published a highly visible piece of social
criticism, then several
issues present themselves.
Scientific Responsibility
I have taken considerable space to present a rather technical analysis of this
piece of science publishing to illustrate how social criticism can be embedded
in empirical research. I have concluded that in this instance we have
a confusing
combination of the two. And this type of combination raises serious questions in
my mind.
(1) Should social criticism and empirical research be combined? I would answer
a qualified yes. Particularly in the social and psychological
sciences it is often
impossible to separate empirical research from basic social positions. Indeed
the separation may not be desirable, for research in relation to
social positions
is critical to social evaluation. However, I consider it poor science
and potentially
destructive to science and the larger society to confuse a position of social
criticism with the research pertaining thereto.
The dangers are twofold. (a) It may preclude a clear analysis of the empirical
data. (h) It may lead to dismissal of the data because of the social position
it supports or negates; or conversely the data may lend undue
credence to a social
position solely on the merits of the present data of the study.
(2) How should social criticism and empirical research be combined?
When no distinction
is made between the two in a report, then the above dangers are
encountered. Those
dangers are in a sense logical and technical problems of accurate reading of a
report. But an unclear combination also confuses the basic distinction between
science and social policy. Science cannot determine human attitudes or define
social policy. To my mind social criticism and the ensuing debate over humane
and moral directions for social action cannot be resolved by appeal
to empirical
data alone. More social action is a uniquely human responsibility. 9 15
Therefore, it seems most necessary that we do not subvert scientific research
and publication as propaganda for a social position. Conversely, we should not
shirk the responsibility to engage in forthright social criticism and
social moral
dialogue. To confuse the two can lead only to discredit of
intellectual autonomy
in the scientific enterprise-as in the Lysenko science of the
Stalinist era. And
just as important, it makes social criticism an objective amoral affair, rather
than the moral responsibility of all of us in a human society.
On these counts, then, the Rosenhan publication presents an example of dubious
procedure that should
he cause for concern for both the scientist and the
social critic. In fact I happen to agree with much of
the Rosenhan criticism and I am largely in sympathy
with his social positions. However I strenuously object
to his perhaps unwitting subervision of both science
and social criticism. For in this instance we all lose
rather than gain.
REFERENCES
1Gumming F. Systems of Social Regulation. New York: Atherton, 1968.
2Duff, F. S. & Hollingshead, A. B. Sickness and Society. New York; Harper
& Row, 1968.
3Cauron, E. F. & Dickinson, J. K. Diagnostic Decision Making in Psychiatry.
Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 14:225, 1966.
4Harty, M. K. Studies in Clinical Judgment. Bull. Meninger
Cl. 35:335, 1971.
5Kendell, R. E., Everett, B., Cooper, J. E., Sartorious, N., & David, M. E.
The Reliability of the 'Present State' Examination. Social Psychiat.
3:123, 1968.
6Levinson, D. J., Mesrilield, J., & Berg, K. Becoming a Patient. Arch. Gen.
Psychiat. 17:385, 1967.
7Pattison, E. M., Coe, F. & Rhodes, R. 3. Evaluation of Alcoholism Treatment: Comparison of Three Facilities.
Arch.
Gen. Psychiat. 20:478, 1969.
9Pattison,, E. M., Bishop, L. A., & Linsky, A. S. Changes in
Public Attitudes on Narcotic Addiction. Amer. J. Psychiat.
125:160, 1968.
10Pattison, E. M. Psychosocial and Religious Aspects of Medical Ethics. In: To
Lice and To Die. R. H. Williams (ed.) New York: Springer-Verlag, 1973.
11Rosenhan, D. L. On Being Sane in Insane Places. Science
179:250, 1973.
12Rosenhan, D. L. Response to Letters to the Editor. Science
180:365, 1973.
13Schwartz, M. S. & Schwartz, C. C. Social Approaches to
Mental Patient Care. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964.
l4Tischler, G. T. Decision-Making Process in the Emergency Room. Arch. Gen.
Psychiat.
14:69, 1966.
l5Ward, C. H., Beck, A. T., Mendelson, M., Mock, J. E., & Erbaugh, J. K. The Psychiatric Nomenclature.
Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 7:198, 1962.