Science in Christian Perspective
The Linguist and Axioms Concerning the Language of Scripture
KENNETH L. PIKE
Department of Linguistics
University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan
From: JASA 26
(June 1974): 47-51.
Author's Note: Otis heal and Dr. Frank Andersen read on earlier draft of this
paper, and mode numerous very helpful suggestions. If they were
writing a similar
paper, it seems clear that they would state a number of points differently, and
especially would give warnings against abuses of such axioms in
different degrees
or in a different manner. This paper has also been published by the
Graduate Christian
Fellowship of Australia, Interchange 12, 228-31 (1972)
Some of my academic colleagues seem to hold to theories which are
useful in their
offices, but are such that one cannot live by them. Thus a deterministic view
may be a tool for scientific research, but if carried consistently forward in
all details, does not allow for normal living. I, however, search for
a theoretical
view which works not only in my office, but on the street, and at
home-or in church.
Since I am a linguist, I need, therefore, to look at all those
problems of Christian
living which appear to me to contain a language component. This may
be especially
true today, when the relation of language to the message of God is much in the
fore. It seems possible, also, that it may be no accident that linguistics has
become a prominent vehicle for the work of God, just at the time in the history
of the church that these other problems have arisen in great strength. And it
may, therefore, be the responsibility of the linguist to search to
see if by chance
there is some minor place where his technical working assumptions
might be helpful.
Here, then, are some general principles which I have been thinking about which
might be relevant. They are given deliberately from a linguistic point of view.
They claim to be neither the whole truth nor the only truth, but in my opinion
they should be studied by theologians especially by those who may be accustomed
to attend seminars on the inspiration of the Scriptures-conferences with no one
present whose professional training is in the area of theory of the nature of
language.
Axiom la: Bible language is human language, normal in pattern, rules, use.
It is observed empirically, by linguistic methods, that the language
of the Scriptures
is natural language.
One cannot differentiate the Greek used in the New Testament from the language
of the time. It is not even elevated style, but the language of the man in the
street. It is ordinary language, spoken by ordinary linguistic rules
such as those
studied at the Summer Institute of Linguistics by persons preparing to analyze
unwritten languages for the Wycliffe Bible Translators.
This implies that whenever we listen to Bible language, or study it,
it is within
the framework of the principles which apply to all language. It leads us to ask
questions about the nature of language in general, since these
principles in turn
affect our interpretation of a Biblical language. Hermeneutics is
integrated here
with linguistics. We wish to know what language is structured like,
how it works,
and something about its strengths for communicating a point of view, as well as
the constraints imposed upon it by the way of structure while doing so.
It may be no accident that linguistics has become a prominent vehicle for the work of God.
Axiom ib: Jesus spoke ordinary human language.
Jesus spoke the contemporary vernacular, which, like any living
language, enables
people to communicate effectively. It is not fair to the resources of
a language
to say "words fail me"; it is rather that we fail to
exploit the potentialities
of a language, or to use it with sufficient creativity.
Jesus' creativity functioned in a matrix of sociological usage and
literary tradition
which supplied the common ground for himself and his listeners: he
spoke in their
language. Hence any knowledge we can gain of the linguistic milieu of
early first
century Palestine will aid in understanding the words of Jesus. His
work is firmly
embedded both in history and in human language and culture. Jesus in
his incarnation
accepted the constraints of human language, just as he accepted constraints as
to walking in time and place in a body.
Axiom ic: Jesus' message was incarnate in human language, yet
"without sin".
Christ was incarnate in the flesh of man, but grew up with no hone broken, and
no sin in that flesh. It seems to me worth exploring the suggestion
that the discussion
of inerrancy of Scriptural writings is similarly an attempt to
express our belief
that in some sense difficult to define or get agreement as to
details-the Scriptures
are also preserved without certain of the kinds of twisted meanings which the
twisted bodies of our forefathers would have generated had they been
left without
guiding controls. But the borderline between sin and no nsin is very
hard to specify
(often impossible to do so) even in ethical matters of the daily walk, since a
component of intent enters, and Christian people differ even in their
interpretation
of ethical detail-for example, as to the point where duty to God overrides duty
to government, or as to voting when the choice is restricted to options between
greater and lesser evils. Similarly, Christians differ strongly as to
which kinds
of interpretation of details of Scripture would lead to their being
"warped"
or wrong. It is not my purpose here to try to discuss any of these
areas of disagreement;
rather I wish to suggest a few further principles which interest me.
Axiom 2a: In natural language, and hence in Scriptural language, one can make
some true statements.
From this axiom, without which human behavior as we know it could not exist, I
believe, important consequences flow.
What criterion of truth will work for a natura llanguage statement
which is neither
complete nor unambiguous in its detail? Here, as Edward J. Carnell
said once (in
An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, Grand Rapids, 1956, p. 45), "The
true is the quality of that judgment or proposition which, when
followed out into
the total witness of facts in our experience, does not disappoint our
expectations."
That is, the true statement leads its to act so that we will not be
upset by finding
out further details of a situation; we will not have been misled by
false information.
Axiom 2b: As part of the result of man's being created in the image of God, the
communication system of God and that of man are not disjoint.
The implication here is that by creation God has made man's language
sufficiently
like his own internal communication system, whatever that may he, that man's is
a pale reflection of his own and allows talk across the barrier in
both directions.
Axiom 2c: Human language is a sufficient vehicle for carrying
communication from
God in pro positional form.
The assumption that the language of man is continuous with that of
God opens the
way for us to find propositional content sharable in two-way
communication between
the two. He can get his cognitive message through to us. I do not asume this,
on the contrary, for the relations between God and a snail.
Axiom 3a: The scriptures are translatable in their crucial intent and
content.
Various important consequences hang on this as
48
sumption. We could not hope to translate successfully into another language if
Axiom 2c were false, if God's message could not be communicated in
human language.
If the Greek and Hebrew of Scriptures had to be special languages, due to some
inherent defect in Hebrew and Greek as natural languags, then the same defect
would carry over into all translations. Similarly, Axioms la and lb
are necessary
as underlying belief before one can assume that the Scriptures can be
translated.
Transcultural communication must be granted as possible, or human society as we
experience it would he impossible. But more than a crude approximation must be
possible; the communication must be in some sense transculturally
effective.
The assumption that the language of man is continuous with that of God opens the way for us to find propositional content sharable in two-way communication between the two.
There are differences of view within this requirement. Effectiveness
may be equated
with inerrancy (as in my Axiom lc), or with effectiveness only at
points assumed
to have theological relevance.
It should be observed closely, however, that linguists of both persuasions are likely to agree that
there is inevitable category slippage in translation, and that this
poses certain
problems for the translator. On the one hand he must accept some
"losses"
(for example, in a language with no plural suffixes it would be unwise at every
occurrence to try to find phrasal substitutes for plurality, even
when in crucial
contexts it is always possible to show plurality); on the other, he is tied to
"additions" of categorial distinction (as, for example, in a language
which must differentiate between familiar and formal kinds of
pronouns for 'you',
where one or the other must of necessity be used, but where choice
implies a small
component of meaning.)
This factor demands that the translator make judgments about the marginality of
some of the categorical elements. And this in turn implies some
unavoidable subjective
judgment by every translator on the intent or cruciality of the context of the
Scriptures. We make room for this judgment by this axiom-but at the same time
recognize that translator judgments will differ, (hence a translation
committee),
even when they share the same presuppositions about the nature of language and
of theology. If either of these presuppositions differ, the
translation judgments
may vary more widely. The audience aimed at (learned, semi-literate) may also
affect these and related stylistic choices substantially.
In this connection, further, it should be observed that the New
Testament in Greek
is already a translation, in so far as it is quoting Christ and the apostles.
If translation theory cannot allow for truth preserved across translation, in
spite of category slippage, then theology is already in difficulty
linguistically.
Axiom 3b: God can speak English-or any other language.
But the very strength of Axiom 3a may bring to the
linguistically-oriented reader
a further problem which might not concern other readers. If, he might argue, there is effective
translation possible, but with minor category slippage, is there no slippage,
or "error," in the "translation" of the message from Cod's
communication system into the language of man? Our axiom here is
designed to show
that there is a false presupposition underlying the question itself.
The question
implies that there is a given message in specific detail which must
in that detail
be translated for man. But my view, through this axiom, is very different. It
allows to Cod the capacity which any bilingual has, a capacity to
lecture on the
same topic with a slightly different but equally true verbalization
of the topic
at two different times in the same language, or at two different
times in different
languages. That is, the inspiration of propositional revelation into Creek or
Hebrew does not have to be tied first of all to translation axioms, but to more
general axioms connecting language with truth, (cf. Axioms 2a, 2c).
Axiom 4a: No statement includes all possible relevant information: truth is not
equated with completeness of detail.
There is always something left unsaid in every statement; one could always go
into more detail, more background, more presuppositions made explicit. One can
always add massive "footnotes" and excessive technical
jargon, but this
would stop communication rather than helping it. Thus one cannot equate truth
in communication with completeness of every detail.' If one tried to do so, any
truth in science would eventually be impossible.
Axiom 4b: Every statement in natural language has a range of potential meanings
from which the intended one must be selected by use of context and the general
thrust (or meaning) of the document as a whole.
There is a range of ambiguity to every statement in all natural language; taken
in isolation, every word has a range of meanings. Selection of the special set
of meanings for the words within any one sentence must be made in a
way appropriate
to both (a) the immediate context and (b) the discourse as a whole.
One cannot equate truth in communication with completeness of every detail.
But for natural language to work as it does in behavior, where people
assume that
friends sometimes tell the truth,' we must assume the possibility of some true
statements-and hence for Scripture statements as well. Note that for
interpretation
of a passage, a subjective judgment of the author's intent is unavoidable, as
is a subjective judgment as to the relation of an item to its
context. The evangelical
may be concerned about possible abuses of such an axiom, but as far as I know,
interpretation of any document, including the Scriptures as an
integrated whole,
cannot escape from it.
Axiom 4e: The interpreter of a document must assume that its author intended to
communicate some meaning, and that he probably (i.e., except in special instances of deliberate
obfuscation) tried to do so in a coherent manner.
In natural language, therefore, if we do not at first understand, we search for
a meaning which we have missed (or we may even ask a speaker what his meaning
was). When we don't succeed in finding such a coherent surface meaning, we may
start looking for a "hidden" meaning, a joke, a pun, or a
metaphor So,
too, with the Scriptures. We assume a meaningfulness, an intent, a coherence of
doctrine. None of these things are "provable" in certain
ways; but all
must be assumed for rationality.
Here, again, there are possible abuses of the axioms. Interpreters may distort
a document, or a point of view, by attributing to a person a meaning which was
far from his thought-by trying to analyze hidden motives, or by bringing some
philosophy or interpretation to hear, e.g., psychologizing, which was alien to
the author. Yet the necessity of playing fair with a document, with
the author's
observable statements, does not eliminate the necessity of searching
for the coherence
of an isolated passage with its larger or remote contexts. And somehow we must
leave to the interpreter some possibility of judging coherence in a document;
without this capacity, even though it be a subjective one, no
theological system
could be rationally discussed.
Axiom 5a: Every report is selective.
Even a lengthy report of an event can never give all the detail of
the situation
during any twominute period; it is vast, with the numbering of the
hairs of each
man's head being only a small part of the specification of the situation which
includes the atomic spin of each element in each hair. Hence, every report is
selective; only some parts can be given, those judged by the writer
to be relevant
to some purpose.
Axiom 5b: An effective true summary may necessarily be verbatim or
complete.
If one wishes a short summary of a discourse which lasted an hour,
and for which
the crucial terms were dispersed over many paragraphs, the most
effective summary
may not be a 'specific sentence or paragraph, or miscellaneous bits
of paragraphs
quoted verbatim, but one which concentrates the terms into a more compact form
than they were in the original discourse. Such a summary is a true
report of the
event, provided that one does not affirm that he is giving a complete verbatim
report or a selection of "exactly" quoted hits. Even that
kind of report
would still be incomplete since it leaves out intonation, voice
quality and timing,
and personal vocal characteristics.
Axiom 5e: Indeterminacy occurs at the borderlines of linguistic
taxonomic classes.
This axiom affirms that in linguistic theory we are frequently
puzzled about difficult
cases; whether an item is to be considered as a noun or a verb may be
impossible to decide by non-arbitrary criteria, or by
criteria which can meet the approval of linguists
working under the same axiomatic sets. Other kinds of ambiguity crop up in many
places in linguistic theory and practice.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that in handling problems related to the language of the Scriptures we may be at times in doubt. Is a particular item to be
considered a metaphor?
If it is a major matter, like the resurrection, a difference of judgment will
lead to effectively two different religions; if it is a minor matter, relative
to a treatment of Christianity, it may lead to merely individual
preference; all
shades come between.
There can be no escape from this kind of problem. No extensive
legalistic judgment
can ever resolve all cases of ambiguity; new ones will continue to
arise to require
either further judgments or to handle apparent clashes within a
particular system.
Christian faith must commit itself on the major decision points, as
to those which
it believes to have been the intent of our Lord and of the Scriptures
as a whole;
to make secondary judgments about those which may divide us as working 'teams'
in denominations or institutions, since they sometimes appear to individuals to
be of sufficient importance to change their allegiance to institutions; and to
have charity on those matters which do not affect in serious measure
the perceived
intent of God toward man, nor our behavior toward one another, nor
our commitment
to following orders towards God's program for his church in the world.
Axiom 6a: Languages change over a period of time.
As far as I can tell, no linguist would question this basic axiom.
Nevertheless,
this axiom, in connection with Axiom la, that the Biblical language is normal
language, has extremely important consequences. The briefest study of Chaucer,
let alone of Old English, lets us know that in 500 to 1000 years our language
has changed radically, so radically that we do not understand it without aids.
This we take to be normal for all language.
When, therefore, we hear discussed-or study for ourselves if we are
Hebrew scholars-the
language of the Old Testament, and note that if we accept the Mosaic authorship
of the Pentatuch, and comparable judgments about other Old Testament writings,
then the gap of time between Moses and Malachi can cause us to think of Beowulf
(Old English) and the New York Times, and there is no reason to
suppose that the
change was any less.
Thus we are faced with two quite diferent problems: (1) On the one
hand, I gather
(from other scholars, since I am not competent in this area) that there is more
diversity within the Old Testament documents than is often
recognized. (Differences
of dialect among the writers, or differences of older forms preserved in some
of the songs, for example, may have been insufficiently studied.) (2)
On the other
hand, the degree of uniformity within the documents is such that they could not
reflect in their present form the precise original shapes in which
they were written,
or the historical changes affirmed by this axiom (in connection with Axiom la,
that Bible language is normal language) as inevitable. The conservative scholar
must come to closer grips with linguistic problems raised by the
relation between
(a) an original set of documents written over a time span which must
have involved
(by this axiom) substantial differences, and (b) our current Scriptures which
do nut include that degree of difference. Somewhere this involves the need for
theologians to discuss in detail the nature of an original document
in reference
to such changes in transmission or standardization, or compilation,
and thus implications for meaning (and compare Axiom 3a).
Axiom 7a: Language requires a perspective from which the speaker is to talk, if
he is to talk at all. The necessity for such a starting point is
inherent in all
communication, and of itself is- to be equated neither with truth nor
with error,
but with the innate properties of the communication system.
When for example, we are talking with someone, we speak of ',I and you;"
but our companion also takes himself as the starting point when he uses "I
and you," even although "I" in the first instance is applied to
me, and in the second instance, is applied to him. The change of
perspective has
nothing to do with truth or error, but with getting a starting point from which
people can talk.
The Bible is not to be used as a textbook on physics, since its truth was not
written from that perspective.
The significance of this axiom goes far beyond the use of pronouns where it is
clear, however. It is this axiom which is related to Axioms 4b,c in
terms of intent.
If, for example, the starting point in a particular moment of
discourse is surveying
land to put up a building in the center, the map and coordinates used, and the
theory behind the procedure, are specifically those of a mercator
projection (in
which the north pole is stretched out clear across the map) and a flat world.
No one believes the latter two circumstances to be truth-nor is anyone deceived
by it in a way relevant to the intent of the local survey and
messages communicating
between surveyor and architect or law department. When planning a great circle
airplane route, or an expedition to the north pole, however, a different map is
used, and a different model of the physical world which allows
communication about
shortest distances through the air, and journeying from eastern to
western hemisphere
over the pole. When a particular perspective (or
"projection") is used
in an area inappropriate to it, serious difficulties arise in
selecting appropriate
behavior for response.
The Bible is not to be used as a textbook on physics, since its truth was not
written from that perspective, nor to provide a map which would
prescribe appropriate
behavior in the physical sciences. Similarly, no one particular parable should
be stretched beyond limits, for it also is then being treated as a
kind of a map
to be followed in behavior in areas for which it was not designed.
Since truth is given in a message which must be related to a starting point of
perspective, interpretation can be in error by a wrong identification of this
point of perspective. This places error in the interpretation rather
than in the
original statement.
Axiom 7b: There may be culturally determined habits of reporting events.
A person in that culture, using with integrity the language habits in the way
his colleagues do, would neither disappoint them nor be disappointed
(in the Carnell
sense-see quotation under Axiom 2a) if he
were later to see a re-play of the scene; he would not have to say, "I was
wrong there, wasn't I?"
Yet it is astonishing how sentences can appear to be wrong if one is
not "seeing"
the context correctly. Recently I was reading some (unpublished)
material by Adam
Makkai in which he shows how wrong one can be in such judgments. For example,
he gives the sentence: "It was five years before he was horn and
seven years
after she died that the baby divorced his grandmother". Suppose,
he queries,
that this is said by folks who believe in reincarnation, with change of sex in
the meantime, and the word "divorce" has the meaning of
freeing oneself
from a certain kind of guardianship-then the sentence makes sense. Tremendous
difficulties arise constantly in linguistic discussions these days on
such matters.
If this is true for current English how much more for the past, where we do not
know the culture intimately! (It suggests that we may need to wait until we too
can see the "re-play" before assuming that some Scripture sentences
are in error, rather than in a surface clash which we find currently
unresolvable.)
Axiom 7c: Inspiration is not dictation, but works concurrently with
normal human
literary activity.
No serious evangelical theologian known to me adopts a dictation
theory of inspiration.
Nevertheless, my personal feeling is that occasionally evangelicals who affirm
the nondictation view do, in fact, adopt, perhaps emotionally rather
than intellectually,
a view which is difficult to distinguish from dictation. If verbal inspiration
is treated so strongly that no single word is under the simultaneous
normal control
of the author, but is exclusively under the control of the Holy Spirit, then it
is easy to move to the belief that the surface individual coloring of different
authors' styles is no more than the effect of complete verbal control through
a non-active "mold," like a plastic squeezed through a form in which
the form has no initiative.
Through natural language we can speak truth, with intent and content interpreted in the light of the cultural and linguistic content of the time and of the moment of utterance.
If, however, we try to affirm the concursive role of the human
author, there must
be left room for the normal human active struggle to compose a
letter, for conscious
systematic organization of a discourse, for deliberate attempts to
clothe a message
in both metaphors and words and structures which would be effective
to the chosen
audience and pleasing to the authors in terms of style. Each has his
own geographical
time, and
dialect, a dialect which is also placed i colored by his own personal
characteristics.
Axiom 7d: Natural language is oriented to the viewpoint of action as lived, not
to some abstraction.
So the understanding of language and literature, and of sociology, and history,
must be brought to bear upon the understanding of Scripture passages which are
in turn in natural language (Axiom la).
Axiom 7e: A message may he carried by metaphor but is not thereby
identified with
it.
In connection with Axiom 7c, this one specifies that the understanding of the
nature of the dawning day, for example, is not to be equated with an
understanding
of the laws of physics; and the phenomenological reference to the rising sun is
not to he equated to physical laws.
To confuse metaphor with message, when message is dependent upon metaphor for
its communication, is to assume the presence 0f error where there is none. On
the other hand, to assume that no explicit truth can be communicated
through metaphor,
or to assume that serious statements intended to represent concrete events are
to be taken as metaphor, is to deny intended message. At this point differences
of belief concerning the specific relation of metaphor to message will lead to
different affirmations of faith, as liberalism over against
orthodoxy. The study
of language, as language, does not by itself resolve such problems or
disagreements.
As an orthodox Christian assumption, but not one growing out of the nature of
language as such, we choose to believe that the statements about the
resurrection
of Christ are to he taken as sober fact, not metaphor.
Axiom 7f: There is a hierarchy of commitment to the nonmetaph orical
versus metaphorical
elements in the Scriptures.
In an ambiguous or clashing situation, a general commitment to a
theological perspective-say
some denominational pattern, or a particular perspective which integrates the
Old Testament with the Newleads to the selection of one
interpretation over another.
This may show up in relation to the elements considered metaphorical
by different
individuals.
Here, then, are more important and less important doctrines, from the view of
a judgment as to some central core of doctrines. In some
denominations, the area
of difference of opinion on the borderlines may he greater than in others-but
every preacher speaking of a new insight, and every teacher or
theologian trying
to advance the understanding of his community, witnesses to the
presence of such
differences on some scale.
Summary
The view of language which I hold, tries to come to terms with the
observed fact
that the language of Scripture is natural language; but that through
natural language
we can speak truth, with intent and content interpreted in the light
of the cultural
and linguistic content of the time and of the moment of utterance. Within this
language, Christ has spoken to us, in saying to the Father, "Thy Word is
truth".
REFERENCES
1For discussion of Axioms 4a and 4b, see my "Strange Dimensions
of Truth"
in Christianity Today, 5. pp. 25-28, May 8, 1961; reprinted in "With Heart
and Mind", pp. 46-53, 1962.
2See Axiom 2a. But if one follows William Hordern, there is amhiqnity and hence
not infallibility in the statement, 'God is love,' since one could
get the wrong
impression from it. See my discussion of this point in the reference given in
Reference 1.