Science in Christian Perspective
Making New Men: A Theology of Modified Man
D. GARETH JONES
Department of Anatomy
University of Western Australia Australia
From: JASA 26
(December 1974): 144-154.
Revolutionary Times
You and I are living in revolutionary times. In this, of course, we
are far from
unique. Most ages have been revolutionary in one way or another. And
yet I believe
there may be a profound difference between today and earlier times.
While previous
revolutions have undoubtedly exerted a considerable influence on
numerous parameters
in the life of man, including the structure of his societies, his physical and
mental well-being, and his philosophical and religious outlook, they
have principally
been external in origin. And so, although they have increased man's
control over
his environment and to a lesser extent over himself, and although
they have served
to modify man's view of himself, they have had only a limited effect on man as
man.
There is however, a revolution currently under way with implications for
man as man far beyond anything yet experienced. And this is what I will refer
to as the biological self-identity revolution. This is just one of
the revolutions
in progress at the present time and yet I consider it underlies all the others
and is basic to them. The biological self-identity revolution is a
crisis in the
life of man, stemming from the control man is beginning to exercise
over his very
existence and destiny as a biological and spiritual being. In other words, this
revolution has its origin in what man is and in what he is going to be. If this
revolution comes to fruition it may well force its to revise our
concepts of man
and of his role and status on this planet. This is because the man
who may emerge
from the biological self-identity revolution could be radically different from
the man we now know.
Let me quote a few examples from writers concerned with this question.
Coming: the control of life. All of life, including human life. With
man himself
at the controls. Also coming: a new Genesis-The Second Genesis, The
creator, this
time around-man. The creation-again, man. But a new man. In a new image.
What we believe about man, what we want for man, will profoundly influence what
actually happens to man.1
Man, who has already learned to remake his physical environment, will
now acquire
. . . . the capacity to remake himself. The duct of the earth, having
become conscious
of the dust of the earth, will be able to recreate itself without
benefit of the
original creator's breath-and to recreate itself in virtually any image, thus
becoming an active participant in the new Genesis.2
Man himself is a part of nature, and he is now capable of changing the rules.
It is not vanity to say that mass has become like a god. Since,
god-like, we can
now alter nature, including that part of nature which is man himself, we can no
longer console ourselves with the thought that a search for
scientific knowledge
is its own justification. It has ceased to be true that nature is governed by
immutable laws external to ourselves. We ourselves have become responsible.3
Man is already so marvellous that he deserves all our efforts to
improve him further.4
The development of biology is going to destroy to some extent, our traditional
grounds for ethical beliefs, and it is not easy to see what to put in
their place.
I think that in time the facts of science are going to make us become
less Christian.5
Biomedical scientists are encouraged by that curious new breed of
techootheologiaus
who, after having pronounced God dead, disclose that God's dying
command was that
mankind should undertake its limitless, no-holds-barred, self-modification, by
all feasible means.6
These quotations, from writers with varying viewpoints, demonstrate
very clearly
the concern and hope currently being expressed at the directions in which some
areas of biological research are pointing. Basic to them all is the belief that
man's nature is capable of radical modification, and will indeed be radically
modified, in the foreseeable future. The consequences of such modification will
probably be momentous for the human race, and will pose questions of
major importance
for scientists, lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, theologians and last, but
not least, the ordinary human being.
My aim in this paper is to analyse the implications of some of these advances
from the stance of one haying Christian presuppositions. I will therefore he primarily
concerned with theological
repercussions, and not with sociological, biological or legal
consequences, legitimate
as these latter concerns are.
Christians and Relevance
The reasons for my interest in this topic may he worth outlining. In the first
place, I believe Christians should be prepared to meet the future, meaning the
future in all its guises tomorrow with its very practical problems,
1984 with its
inevitable overtones of totalitarian regimentation and strict
biological control,
the year 2000-that climactic finale to a century of madness and chaos
or the dawn
of a new age pregnant with boundless, undreamt-of possibilities. And
on into the
distant future so optimistically depicted by Julian Huxley and
Teilbard de Chardin,
those mid-twentieth century dreamers of scientific humanism. And finally, into
the mists of eternity, radiant with hope for those committed to the lordship of
Jesus Christ, dark and mysterious for so many others. It is my contention that
evangelicals have for long felt at home in "eternity", being expert
at arguing out a particular view of the millenium and second coming
and yet tragically
uninterested in presenting a cogent Christian position regarding the social and
biological problems looming over us. It is these issues with which I
will be dealing
here, although the more distant future encompassing the cosmic role of Christ
is one which Christians should also be seriously studying.7
In the second place, I am convinced that if theology is to he relevant it must
encompass what may he termed secular issues. As a biologist I find it
distressing
to turn to the theological works on "man", and find nothing of direct
relevance to a contemporary understanding of man with his
specifically twentieth
century problems. If theology therefore is to speak to real man, it must delve
into the issues which confront man in a real world. And it is at this
point that
the Christian grounded in biblical and theological principles and trained in a
particular professional discipline has his specific contribution to
make. He alone
is in a position to enhance that wider body of theology, by seeking
to enunciate
theological principles relevant to his sphere of interest. It is for
this reason
that I have subtitled this paper "a theology of modified man".8
Third, and more specifically, the human race is heading at alarming speed into
a totally unknown and unexperienced realm where man himself becomes
the controller
and potential manipulator of his own body and brain. This is where the novelty
so alarmingly described by Toffler9 comes into its own. This is where "the
human body ... until now a fixed point in human experience, a 'given' . . . .
will no longer he regarded as fixed".10 This new biology will raise,
and has even started to raise, questions with far-reaching implications chief
amongst which must be "what is man?" Will the old answers stand up to
the assault of previously unimagined changes? If not, how may our view of man
be altered, and what guidelines will be required in formulating new concepts?
The contribution of Christian thinking to this debate should be a central one,
indeed must be a central one, if man is to survive.
The man who may emerge from the biological self-identity revolution could be radically different from the man we now know.
Areas of Critical Importance
I want to deal with three principal areas of research, because it is
these which
are most likely to eventuate in the near future and which pose the most serious
questions for the human race. These are the areas of (1) prenatal manipulation
including genetics, (2) organ transplantation and (3) brain research. Each of
these is well-under-way at present, and each has already brought about marked
changes in human attitudes. There is every prospect therefore, that within the
next 10-20 years research within these fields will bring us face-to-face with
the profoundest of questions concerning the meaning of man and the
extent to which
he can be changed and still remain human.
It is these areas of investigation and debate which lie at the heart
of biophilosophy,
or as Rosenfeld has termed it biosoeioprolepsis, i.e., the
anticipation of biology's
impact on society.11 The prospect of men making new men, which
implies different
or modified men using biological techniques, may not readily appeal to us and
yet is in sight. What I now want to do is to spell out briefly the evidence for
such a prospect and the questions which inevitably follow.
Prenatal Manipulation
One egg, one embryo, one adult-normality. But a bokanovskified egg
will bud, will
proliferate, will divide. From eight to ninety-six buds, and every
bud will grow
into a perfectly formed embryo, and every embryo into a full-sized
adult. Making
ninety-six human beings grow where only one grew before. Progress.
Standard men and women; in uniform batches. The
whole of a small factory staffed with the products of a single bokanovskified
egg. 'Ninety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical machines!'12
The wife is stimulated with hormones to produce several ova in a
mentsrual cycle.
By means of minor surgery under general anaesthesia one or more ova
are withdrawn
through the abdominal wall, a procedure that can he done repeatedly.
The ova are
then fertilized with the husband's sperm, and within five days or so have grown
in the laboratory to more than thirty-two cells. The last step to be taken when
more is known about the embryonic development will he to replace the embryo in
the wife so that it will implant and grow to full term to be
delivered naturally.13
In vitro fertilization
The gap separating Aldous Huxley's Brave New
World (written in 1932) and Robert Edwards' embryology research of
the late 1060's
and early 1970's may appear a formidable one, I would suggest
however, that this
is more illusory than real, because once it has been proved possible
to interfere
with the early stages of human development outside the body, the
remaining far-more
dramatic developments will be accomplished given time.
What is the state of the art? The quotation I have
given from the paper of Edwards and Sharpe describes in vitro fertilization of
human ova, that is, fertilization outside the body. In 1966 Edwards
demonstrated
how ova extracted from human ovaries could be cultured in the laboratory
("test-tube")
with the development of ripe eggs. This was followed in 1969 by the
fertilization
of such ova using human sperm, and subsequent, apparently normal development of
the fertilized ova. Taking these techniques further Edwards, together
with a gynaecologist
Patrick Steptoe, reported that they had been successful in taking some eggs as
far as the blastocyst stage, by which time the fertilized egg had divided into
as many as 60-100 cells.14 This is true "test-tube
fertilization", and
while the blastocyst represents a very early stage in development it
is sufficiently
advanced for implantation into a woman's uterus to undergo subsequent maturation.
Recently the first reports have come to hand of the implantation in
women volunteers
of ova fertilized in vitro and the subsequent normal development of
these fetuses.
The applications of this technique put forward hy Edwards and his colleagues as
justification of their research are (1) the alleviation of infertility brought
about by a blockage in the wife's uterine tubes; (2) the ability it bestows on
investigators for sexing the embryo-this in turn is important
because, since many
genetic disorders are sex-linked and hence usually occur in males, these could
he avoided by replacing only female blastoeysts; and (3) modification
of the embryo
itself in an attempt to mask various genetic diseases.15
In spite of these assurances, the technique of in vitro fertilization even in
its present stage of development raises problems. The very act of growing human
eggs outside the body means that a large number will "die"
in the laboratory.
This is implicit in the technique because in order to guarantee one successful
implant as many as ten or so eggs will have to be used. While there is probably
nothing illegal in destroying or allowing to be destroyed unimplanted
blastocysts,16
some may object on ethical grounds to the deliberate destruction of fertilized
human eggs. The fact that certain contraceptive devices, such as intra-uterine
devices (IUD), probably act in much the same way is no solution to
this problem.
The ethical issue is taken further when we consider that a fetus
produced in vitro
may be malformed. A considerable percentage of naturally fertilized
eggs are malformed,
most of which are spontaneously aborted. There is no reason for believing the
percentage will he any lower with in vitro fertilized eggs. Indeed
the manipulation
processes themselves could conceivably increase the possibility of
malformation.
At present there is no way of guaranteeing that the fetus will be normal, as it
is not yet possible to cheek that the implanted blastocyst is free of damage.
It is not difficult to imagine the psychological trauma which may be
experienced
by a couple whose infertility has been overcome by in vitro fertilization, only
to be presented with a malformed baby. This possibility however, is
also present
after other forms of treatment for infertility, and therefore should
not be unduly
emphasized.
What then should our reaction be to this dilemma? There are, it would appear,
three major approaches. In the first place there is the attitude of researchers
like Edwards and his colleagues. Theft aims are chiefly guided by the needs of
their patients, and by the medical wellbeing of any resulting children. Edwards
has written: "We believe it essential that doctors and scientists are free
to pursue research into aspects of
knowledge that could contribute to the well-being of humanity
provided the rights
of the patients, including those of the fetus, are safeguarded as far
as possible."17 He sees no objection to "selecting against afflicted blastoeysts"18,
that is, discarding those with genetic abnormalities, believing this course of
action to be preferable to either aborting affected fetuses or
producing handicapped
children. lie is fully aware of the controversial nature of his work and that
it will bring him into conflict with established social attitudes. He contends
however, that "the rights of blastocysts must be subordinated to
the general
good of society",19 a position he defends by reference to
prevailing liberal
attitudes on abortion.
If theology is to be relevant it must encompass what may be termed
secular issues.
In the second place there are those who, while not unsympathetic to
this position,
feel that human experimentation should wait until equivalent animal experiments
are further advanced .20 Embryo transfer experiments have been confined mainly
to mice and rabbits, while embryos of these species have been
maintained for about
one-third of their total gestation periods in various laboratory media. Linked
to these developments are efforts aimed at designing an artificial
placenta. Experiments
of this nature using laboratory animals present ethical objections to
only a limited
number of people, and from a broad developmental biology point-of view have many
advantages over human material.
A third approach to human in vitro fertilization is that typified by
Paul Ramsey
who has written: "The decisive moral verdict must be that we
cannot rightfully
get to know how to do this without conducting unethical experiments
upon the unborn
who must be the 'mishaps' (the dead and the retarded ones) through
whom we learn
how,"21 Basic to this attitude is the possibility of harm to the fetuses
as a whole, and coupled with this the objection that a hypothetical or unborn
child is being submitted to a dangerous procedure.22 This leads into
the consideration
of when in the course of development a living human embryo acquires protectable
humanity.23 While this latter point raises many well-known, and
virtually unanswerable,
questions, it also introduces a new principle for this debate. This is that, in
contrast to abortion where a fetus already exists in utero, a fetus
is deliberately
being created in this new situation by experimental procedures. Does
this introduce
new ethical considerations?
For myself, I would prefer much greater emphasis at present on animal
experiments,
particularly primate ones. As with all experiments on human patients,
techniques
should previously have been brought as near as possible to perfection
using animal
trials. I can see no reason for abrogating this principle with
respect to in vitro
fertilization. Assuming this principle is adhered to, and human trials are one
day inaugurated with a substantial chance of success, what then? I would tend
to agree with Edwards that the needs of couples and the welfare of
their children
are paramount. Blastoeysts and even much later stages of fetal growth must be viewed as of
secondary importance.
There are however, two important points to he borne in mind at this juncture.
The first is that these procedures are carried out within the family situation.
The second is that in adopting this position I am allowing inroads
into the control
man is exerting over his reproduction and hence over himself. In doing this I
am aware of at least some of the consequences. Using the well
recognized "wedge
principle", what I am allowing is but a start. Once this form of control
has been successfully exploited, far greater degrees of control will
follow. These
are on the horizon at present and I will discuss them in a moment.
My reason for allowing this is that man has been given responsibility
by God for
exerting authority over his environment and over himself. Later on I
will return
to this principle. At this point I simply wish to suggest that the techniques
I have been describing do not contravene this principle, as long as
they are carried
out for the benefit of society. Of course this tpe of control over
human reproduction
is itself simply' an extension of current, and generally accepted
practices. This
does not justify in vitro fertilization, but it should make its
question current
methods of controlling and modifying human reproduction and ask what
ethical issues
they too may raise.
Certain contraceptive techniques prevent the implantation of blastoeysts, while
A.I.H. (artificial insemination by the husband) removes by one step the human
aspect of reproduction. A.I.D (artificial insemination by a donor) introduces
many further difficulties, ethical, psychological and legal, and yet
it is estimated
that up to 10,000 AID, children are born each year in the United States alone.
It is not my intention to discuss AID., except to point out that it, plus its
extensions, sperm bank AID, and "space-time" sperm banks '24 are procedures
currently in use or feasible at present. They reflect a considerable degree of
manipulation over human reproduction and represent half-way houses
between natural
reproduction and rigorously controlled reproduction. The future is very close
and prenatal manipulation plays a role in many of our lives. But where is our
theology of prenatal manipulation?
Prenatal adoption
I have spent some time in discussing in vitro fertilization because
it is a contemporary
development and constitutes the springboard for all other forms of
prenatal manipulation.
I would agree that needs of couples and the welfare of their children are paramount. Blastocysts and even much later stages of fetal growth must be viewed as of secondary importance.
The implantation of a fertilized ovum need not he into the same woman from whom
it came. It could be donated by another woman, the gestational or host mother
as opposed to the biological mother, who would then carry the
developing embryo
to term. This has been characterized prenatal adoption by Bentley Glass25 who
sees its use in the future, adapted for eugenic
purposes. He writes: "In the future age of man it will become possible for
every person to procreate with assurance that the child, either one's
own or one
prenatally adopted, has a sound heritage, capable of fully utilizing
the opportunities
provided by society for optimal development".26
The possibility of host mothers to incubate someone else's fertilized ovum has
led to extravagant pictures of "wombs for rent", given the
appropriate
social structure. After all there have been "wet nannies"
in the past,
why not "host mothers" in the future? This is far from idle
speculation.
It is an accepted method of transporting a number of embryos within
an adult animal
of the same species, for example, in sheep and rabbits.
Such a technique could be used, in theory at least, for maintaining
an ovum fertilized
in the normal way where the wife has uterine abnormalities either
preventing the
implantation of the blastocyst or maintaining a normal pregnancy. The
disadvantages
of the technique would appear enormous. The parent-child relationship
may he dramatically
altered, hearing in mind that it is questionable whom the child would regard as
its parent. Apart from psychological uncertainties regarding
identity, it is likely
that by the time such a procedure became feasible it will he possible to bring
fetuses to term in the laboratory.
Chimeras
Moving further into the realm of manipulation brings us to the mixing of cells
within a fetus. The injection of donor cells into an embryo, and
their subsequent
multiplication during fetal growth leads to the partial colonization of organs.
The resulting fetus is a chimera or hybrid. The emotional way of
envisaging chimeras
is in terms of man-animal hybrids27 or crossspecies cannibalization .28 It is
difficult to know how seriously to take these nightmarish fantasies,
except that
intraspecies donation of cells is far from fantasy and opens the way
for genetic
engineering and composite organ transplants within pre-implantation
embryos .29
Genetic engineering
Genetic engineering must be distinguished from negative eugenics which is the
elimination of bad genes from the population and medical genetics which involves
counseling prospective
parents on the risks of serious hereditary diseases in their children. Genetic
engineering, by contrast, is the attempt to impart new characteristics
to forthcoming
generations by manipulating the genetic material. In other words,
this is positive
eugenics or, to use Lederberg's term, euphenics -the engineering of
human development.30
The substitution of one gene for another by replacing DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) with "better" DNA is possible in
organisms with a very simple chromosomal apparatus, and amazing
results have been
reported from a variety of plants and animals including peas,
bacteria, tadpoles
and newts. Whole genes have been transferred from one cell to
another, suggesting
that gene transplants may he possible; inactive genes in cells have
been "switched
on" to produce enzymes which those particular cells normally do
not produce,
while RNA (ribonucleic acid) foreign to a cell has been introduced into cells
to induce them to behave in novel ways.
The controversy surrounding genetic engineering is intense, even in scientific
eircles.30o The one reaction which is not warranted is complacency.
Even a few years
ago geneticists would have put genetic engineering in the twenty-first century.
Today however, many geneticists would view it as a human possibility
on a limited
scale within 15 years.31
While the processes I have just sketched apply to relatively simple organisms,
an increasing range of procedures is now possible in mammals. For
example, specific
genetic material has been introduced into a mouse cell to replace a deficiency.
This is still a very long way from what is generally envisaged as
successful genetic
engineering in the human, which will involve germ cells rather than body cells
and which will have to be exceedingly exact. This will require major technical
advances, and yet such is the rapidity of genetic advance that a discussion of
its implications is in place.
On the positive side genetic engineering will enable a genetic
defect, say haemophilia,
to be remedied by fertilizing a couple's eggs and sperm in the test
tube and inoculating
blastocysts with normal non-haemophilic cells. The resulting child, which will
be carried in the normal way, will be a haemophilic-normal mosaic, who will in
all probability he normal. Many other so-called "missing
gene" defects
could probably be rectified in a similar manner.32
While the replacement and modification of single genes in the human lies in the
future, these procedures are well within the bounds of reality, and
will be seen
one day as gene therapy. And so just as today complete blood transfusions are caned
out on unborn children suffering from severe rhesus incompatibility
with the mother,
very early embryos will have 'gene transplants' to overcome a wide variety of
genetic disorders.
But what about the misuse of genetic engineering? This is one of the
supreme realms
in which the writers of scientific futurism strive hard to outdo the writers of
science fiction. Rosenfeld writes,
When this kind of biochemical sophistication has been attained, when
man can write
out detailed genetic messages of his own, his powers become truly godlike. Man
will presumably be able to write not any set of
specifications he might desire for his ideal human being. And who can
find fault
with ideal human beings?33
I will return to this question later on. For the moment though, how likely is
this prospect? In the foreseeable future it would appear to be very
slim, simply
because complex qualities such as intelligence are determined by
numerous sets
of genes. And of course the final product of genetic inheritance, that is, the
individual human being, is considerably influenced by his environment and the
diverse pressures resulting from the environment. Even if it were ever possible
to produce our "ideal human being" in genetic terms, the
resulting genetic/environmental
product might be far from ideal unless, of course, the environment
too were ideal.
The controversy surrounding genetic engineering is intense, even in scientific circles. The one reaction which is not warranted is complacency.
Perhaps J.B.S. Haldane best summed up the issue. According to him,
the only problem
with creating a race of human angels is to find the genes for wings
and for moral
perfection. Humorous as that statement may he, it contains a profound
truth geneticists
and anatomists are rarely willing to face. There is more to life than
genes, organs
and ideal bodies.
Linked to this, there is an ethical issue we need to consider. The
preceding discussion
has assumed that conception has taken place or will take place
regardless of genetic
or other difficulties, even when the likelihood of such difficulties
is recognized.
It is then up to the medical geneticist to rectify the abnormality, even if it
involves dispensing with the fetus. It has become unfashionable to question the
wisdom of these steps. Paul Ramsey however, sides with the unfashionable.
Preventive genetic medicine
has a number of familiar, proven options more desirable than genetic
manipulation.
If we want to promote responsible parenthood by means of our
knowledge of genetics
. . . the first question is not whether, assuming the child must be, we should
make it of this or that genetic composition, but whether a conceptus should be
conceived at all. We ought not to choose for another the hazards he must hear,
while choosing at the same time to give him life in which to hear
them and suffer
our chosen experimentations.34
Taken to its logical conclusion this position precludes practically the whole
of genetic engineering, and this is the direction in which Ramsey
himself tends.
It does however, have even wider connotations than this, because with
or without
genetic engineering we are responsible for bringing children, some of whom are
known to have medical defects, into the world. We choose to give them
life. They
have no choice. This is the ultimate dilemma of certain
existentialists, including
Sartre. Man is responsible, but never for his own birth. Quite apart then from
the potential of modem scientific investigation, we must accept the momentous
responsibility of ushering into this world further lives. This is the essence of
our God-given responsibility as
members of the human race, and from this stems all our actions on the
unborn fetus.
Cloning
This may he termed biological predestination. It is the process of
producing carbon-copies
of individuals or, more dramatically, "people from cuttings."35 It is
this technique which will allegedly enable us to produce an endless stream of
exact copies of Mozart or Einstein, or Hitler, of course. Alternatively if your
preference is for an army of a few thousand identical soldiers, all
appropriately
selected for certain conditions of battle, cloning will be the
technique of choice.
And so one could continue. Probably more alarming nonsense has been
written about
this technique than any other in the genetic arena, ideas put forward including
plans for establishing international boards of control and the best
age for cloning
in various groups of the population.36
In essence cloning is asexual reproduction, with the result that the
new individual
or individuals are derived from a single parent and are genetically identical
to that parent. Hence the exact copies. Cloning is brought about by the removal
of the nucleus from a mature but unfertilized egg and replacement by
the nucleus
of a specialized body cell of an adult organism. The egg with its transplanted
nucleus proceeds to develop as if it had been fertilized, and produces an adult
organism which is genetically identical to the organism which served as the source
of the transferred nucleus. In this way it is possible to produce an unlimited
number or clone of identical individuals. Up to the present cloning
has been effected
in animals such as frogs, salamanders and fruit flies.37
There is no theoretical reason to prevent human cloning and it will probably be
feasible within the next few years. It is difficult however, to find
reasons for
doing it. Organ transplantations between members of a clone would
present no problems;
if one partner in a marriage had a severe genetic defect the other could be the
clone-parent; it would be a sure way of selecting the sex (and much else) of a
child. These dubious benefits of cloning are hardly worth serious consideration
as there will relatively shortly be other, far more responsible, ways
of overcoming
these drawbacks.
Cloning may be termed "biological predestination." It is the process of producing carbon-copies of individuals, or, more dramatically, "people from cuttings."
On the deficit side cloning is almost universally condemned, even by relatively
liberal commentators.38 The major problem is that cloned "specimens"
would lack any sense of individuality. It denies to these specimens "the
right to be one's self", and if ever such specimens should exist they will
be in the unenviable position of knowing without a shadow of doubt that they are merely biological replicas, who are essentially preordained and whose
biological future is mirrored in someone else.39
This is a truly frightening possibility because it means we will be
able to produce
people who are not people in that they are denied the chance of
themselves experimenting
with life. They will simply reflect a previous experience. The
psychological trauma
which may result from this is unimaginable. Of course it is possible to argue
that they will not be identical to their cloned-parents or even to
their cloned-siblings,
because of their different environments. If this is the case, and it probably
is, why clone? Instead of the original genius, one may end op with a pathetic
travesty of the great man.
Cloning is an extreme technique and yet it is valuable in that it points to the
extent of dehumanization which will be possible via prenatal manipulation. Kass
has put forward a valuable principle which sums up this section: "We may
not be entitled, in principle, to a unique genotype, but we are entitled not to
have deliberately weakened the necessary supports for a worthy life.
Genetic distinctiveness
seems to me to be one such support."40
Organ Transplantation
I will not deal at length with this topic as the ethical decisions
which principally
surround it are not directly related to modifying man. They have chiefly to do
with the definition of death, which results from the use of cadavers as donors.
Important as these issues are they are peripheral to my main concern
in this study.
The transplantation of kidneys, hearts, livers, lungs and eyes does not usher
in the brave new world. Some of it may he heroic surgery, other
aspects are virtually
routine surgery, but the patient plus his transplanted organ is still much the
same original human being. What about brain or head transplants? For very many
reasons, including technical ones and difficulties concerning the
supply of donors
(!), such transplantation while making good science fiction reading is out of
the question.41
A more profitable line-of-investigation, although still remote in the future,
if even realistic, is the concept of the cyberg. This is the term used for a
cybernetic organism or automated man, in which the machine component
of the organism
receives instructions from the man and also informs him of the conditions it is
encountering.42 For instance, one can imagine a cyberg designed for
astronautics.
He may resemble a man but many of his bodily functions, such as respiration and
communication, would he carried on cybernetically by artificial
organs and sensors.
However fanciful this sounds, far more fantastic man-machine schemes have been
suggested. While I am not concerned with the details of such
prophecies it should
be remembered that they are based on two current developments: the increasing
efficiency and growing use of mechanical prostheses, and the development of the
computer.43
Arthur C. Clarke envisages that Homo sapiens will give way in the
distant future
to Machine sapiens.44 However likely or unlikely this speculation may turn out
to be, it is based on the belief that machines capable of greater intelligence than man will be evolved. This in itself is a
highly debatable
point, and I will not enter that controversy. The modification of man by way of
machines and the computer, however, has its roots in man's present dependence
on these artifacts, and we should ask ourselves to what extent man has already
been modified by them.
Machines are simply extensions of ourselves, because in one sense our
bodies are
machines. It is true we identify with our bodies, and it is this which enables
me to refer to "my body" and to "me". Is an artificial limb
or are artificial heart valves a part of "me"? For those possessing
such gadgets, normal life would be impossible without them. To what
extent then,
do artificial protheses affect our identify? To what extent does our body, or
parts of our body, contribute to our knowledge of ourselves as individual and
distinct beings? In the end we are faced with that perplexing
question: "Who
am I?"
In the light of our answer to this question we may be able to decide
what modifications
a human body is able to undergo and still retain its identity. This applies to
protheses and transplants as well as to genetic manipulation and assaults upon
the brain. Apart from our heredity, the greatest present contributor
to our identity
is undoubtedly the brain. And the brain is particularly vulnerable to external
assault, which is an application of our technological expertise.
Brain Research
The possibilities of misapplication of the results of brain science are already
frightening to many people. Could it he, they ask, that here at last
we face the
ultimate Pandora's Box, a secret whose uncovering would be the destruction of
human society? Has brain research gone far enough, if not tot) far, already?45
These words of Donald MacKay written in 1967 are even more
appropriate today than
then. Brain research has burgeoned over the past few years, and while
we are still
on the threshold of any overall understanding of it, our potential
for manipulating
various aspects of its functioning is increasing daily. So real is this advance
that some people are throwing up their arms in despair and
complaining about the
"rape of the mind."
There is a major difference between the application of this type of research and
that considered previously in the realm of prenatal manipulation.
Whereas intervention
before birth affects the lives and characteristics of those not yet
in existence,
brain manipulation will he carried out on those with known personalities which
may consequently be modified during adult life. Investigations upon the brain
therefore may pose an even greater threat to the integrity of
individuals already
conceived and already possessing recognizable identities. It may not
be an overstatement
to say that the power to change the brain confers a corollary power
which is the
ability to change personality and even self-identity. This is the crux of the
biological selfidentity revolution, and the issues it raises lie at the heart
of biophilosophy and, dare I say it, contemporary theology.
I will deal with the two areas, which it seems to me are crucial in
this debate.
These are the electrical stimulation of the brain and
mood-controlling drugs.
Electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB)
In very general terms we can say that the brain consists of a number of lobes
which are interconnected and which, by virtue of their relationship to the rest
of the body and the outside world by way of the spinal cord and
peripheral nervous
system, constitute a functioning whole. There is therefore constant interplay
between the brain of an individual and the world that individual has
to cope with,
the brain receiving continuous stimuli from the surrounding world and putting
out appropriate information to deal with that world. The picture
which an individual
gives of himself to other individuals is very much the result of
these interactions.
Machines are simply extensions of ourselves, because in one sense our bodies are machines. Is an artificial limb or are artificial heart valves a part of me"?
It is not difficult to appreciate then that damage of the brain
upsets these interactions
and may well alter the picture others have of the affected individual. In other
words, brain damage may alter the individual's personality and in so doing may
alter the person himself. Brain damage may dramatically change a
person's behaviour
patterns, and the question may then be asked: what is a person's real nature?
Do we have a basic personality on which life, and certainly disease,
imposes distortions,
or is our personality nothing more than the construct of our
experience ?46 These
questions become the more pressing when we turn from disease to interventions
in the brain, because issues which were previously unavoidable now
become subject
to man's control.
Within the lobes of the brain there are various areas which have
relatively specific
functions. For instance there are areas concerned with speech, vision, hearing,
motor and sensory functions etc. In addition there is a region
involved in organizing
the metabolism of the body and hence with sensations of hunger and thirst, fear
and rage. One of the principal ways in which these functions have
been localized
to specific regions in both laboratory animals and humans is by inserting small
electrodes into the brain under local anaesthesia and observing what
happens when
a small current is applied. For example if a motor region is stimulated an arm
or leg may involuntarily move, while with an auditory region the
patient may hear
a non-existent conversation or weird sounds.
Using this technique Dr. James Olds found in 1953 that when he
stimulated a region
of the brain known as the hypothalamus in rats, they appeared to
enjoy it.47 Olds
concluded that the parts of the hypothalamus giving this reaction constituted
pleasure centers. Further research indicated that of the pleasure centers one
appears to he associated with eating and another with sexual emotions. Besides
these pleasure centers there is also evidence that aversive or
punishment centers
exist in the hypothalamus, while other centers are apparently involved in the
development of obesity, thirst and hunger. An area close to the hypothalamus,
know as the amygclala, gives a variety of actions when it is stimulated,
the best known
being rage.
It is not difficult to understand why many people regard these data
as detrimental
to a human view of the brain. Once these data are assimilated, much
of the mystique
of the brain, and possibly of the human person, disappears. ESB has therefore,
a great deal to answer for. This is not all, because with understanding conies
potential control. ESB not only facilitates accurate mapping of the brain, it
also ushers in the prospect of modifying human behaviour.
Some of the most dramatic examples of this technique are illustrated
by the work
of José Delgado.48 For instance, he has shown that a
five-second stimulation
of a particular spot in a monkey's brain will make the monkey stop whatever it
is doing, make a face, and turn its head to the right, walk on its
hind legs around
its cage, climb the cage wall and return to the floor. With cessation
of the stimulation
it grunts, stands on all fours and resumes normal activity.
The point here is that each time the button is pressed the monkey goes through
exactly the same ritual. And so one could give numerous examples to illustrate
this point. Cats can be induced into either paroxysms of rage or
excessive contentment
simply by stimulating the appropriate brain region. In one instance
Delgado, with
an excessive degree of showmanship, went into a bull-ring and stopped
a charging
bull by stimulating one of its brain regions by remote control.
Taking these developments
further, it is possible for an animal to stimulate its own brain by pressing a
lever or button connected to electrodes implanted in its brain. And it is from
this that one gets the terrifying picture of a rat continuously stimulating its
own pleasure centers, regardless of food or water, until only exhaustion brings
this tragic sequence of events to a conclusion.
There is no reason why ESB should not bring about this same kind of
thing in human
beings. In principle it is possible now. And under certain circumstances it is
used now.
At present its use in humans falls into two categories-as a
therapeutic tool and
in the continuing treatment of emotional disturbances.
The power to change the brain confers a corollary power which is the ability to change personality and even self-identity.
A term often applied to these uses is psychosurgery.48° By increasing the
current passing through the implanted electrodes, brain tissue can be
destroyed.
This is used to destroy tissue in certain cases of intractable
epilepsy and Parkinson's
disease and sometimes to gain relief from intractable pain. Frontal leucotomy
which was in vogue in the 1930's and l940's and which was, and still
is occasionally,
resorted to in cases of severe depression is a rather less refined example of
psychosurgery.
Far more difficult ethically is the use of psychosurgery in modifying behaviour.
Consequently it may be employed in people characterized by violent outbursts of rage, to destroy the brain region eoneerned.48b Or it can be used not
to destroy brain tissues but simply to quiet a violent psychotic individual by
stimulating electrodes implanted in his brain. This latter application of ESB
is currently used on a limited number of patients in mental hospitals, but its
potential is obvious.
Is there any objection to using ESB as an antidote to specific symptoms? We do
this every day with drugs and conventional surgery. Why not by surgery on the
brain? The underlying question we have to answer is: "What is
normal?"
What are our expectations of the normal individual? When I am calm,
am I any more
me than when I am angry? How do we distinguish between what may he regarded as
"normal" anger and "pathological" anger? And who
decides?
"Who controls the controllers?" Rosenfeld states the
dilemma very perceptively:
"The notion of a man controlling his own brain is one thing. But
the prospect
that a man's brain might he controlled by another is something else
again."49
This issue is an intensely practical one because it brings us into the area of
criminology and of the expectations of society.
If it can be shown that there is a high correlation between deviant
behavior and
brain damage, what is the best way of controlling the deviant behavior? Is it
by primitive measures, coupled perhaps with moral coercion, or by a
direct approach
to the brain of the deviant? An answer to this type of question would take us
into deep philosophical waters, as it involves the relationship
between the brain
and the person. Difficult as this issue is, it requires an urgent
answer because
increasingly courts are having to decide whether a person should be
sent to jail
or a psychiatric institution. Who or what is at fault-the man or his
mental illness?
By what criteria do we decide that a man is or is not responsible for
his actions?
Mood-controlling drugs
Many of the questions raised by the use of these drugs are the same as for ESB.
The" main difference is that these drugs are freely used in the community
at present, and so while their effects may not he as dramatic as ESB,
their overall
significance may be just as great.
There is now a bewildering array of mood-controlling drugs, the
principal groups
being (1) sedatives or hypnotics, e.g., barbiturates; (2) stimulants,
e.g., amphetamines;
(3) tranquillizers, e.g., imipramine (Toframnl) and isocarhoxazid (Marplan); and
(4) hallucinogens e.g., LSD, i.e., the psychedelic drugs.50
At present the majority of these drugs while acting within certain
general limits,
are not unduly specific. They raise or lower the threshold of action of general
systems in the drugbiochemistry-behaviour triad. Of course this may change. The
specifit of these drugs will undoubtedly improve. Are we to be concerned about
this?
In my view the principal dangers arising from the widespread use of these drugs
do not lie in a totalitarian foisting of them on a population. Bather it is the
voluntary taking of psychoactive agents as a means of escape from the
real world
that is far more disturbing. While some of these drugs are highly
useful in many
circumstances and are probably iudispcnsihle in present-day society,
their overindulgence
can be a means of shielding people from pressures they should face squarely
and if possible
resolve.
Drugs are modifying our behaviour patterns far more profoundly than we may care
to realize. What is happening is that we are looking for
technological solutions
to our problems, as opposed to social solutions. It is generally far easier to
prescribe drugs to alleviate symptoms than to tackle the social
situation giving
rise to the symptoms. While this use of drugs is undoubtedly
justified, the increasing
dependence upon drugs by an increasing number of people and by
society as a whole
may actually lead to a change in the quality of life.51
A disturbing side-effect of this trend is that seen in society's treatment of
certain social misfits. The condition of "minimal brain dysfunction"
is a relatively recent condition characterized by children whose behaviour is
socially unacceptable. Children who are "hyperkinetic" on the basis
of their school reports are regarded as in need of treatment with a
daily administration
of doses of amphetamines.
Great care needs to be taken in equating unacceptable behaviour or personality
disorders with brain malfunction. The latter should first be proven
before neurobiological
or neuropharmaeological action is taken to "cure" it.
We do not know how far the techniques of ESB and mood-controlling
drugs will develop.
Let us hope the day never comes when men and women will sit down comfortably in
their armchairs and stimulate their pleasure centers for hours on end. This is
hardly an endearing prospect, but whether it is any different in principle from
living on a diet of tranquillisers, alcohol and T.V. is a debatable point.
Perhaps the brave new world is already here, and yet because of our obsession
with the horrors of technology and not with its benefits, it has
quietly overtaken
us.
Towards A Theology of Modified Man
The modification of man raises some of the profoundest issues we will
ever face.
I will briefly outline what appears to me to be some of the essential
principles
requiring consideration in formulating a theological approach to them.
1. Research will continue
There can be no moratorium on future biological research, unless this
is desired
by the scientists involved, as may he the ease with certain forms of bacteria
research termed "plasmid engineering." It would be fallacious though
to rest our hopes on any such limitation. Research will continue, and
will probably
also continue to escalate.
It could be argued that because the aims of certain workers in these fields are
essentially humanistic, this type of research should be opposed on
Christian grounds.
To suggest this is to confuse philosophical principles and the
scientific enterprise.
Scientific research is not dependent upon the aspirations of its exponents in
this simple manner. Christians therefore are to be concerned with
analyzing each
technique on its merits rather than inveighing against these areas of research
as a whole on questionable philosophical grounds.
2. Man is viceregent for God
Man has been given dominion over the created order by God. 52 He is therefore to be responsible for it, in that he
is to exercise
his power in accordance with God's moral nature. "His sense of
responsibility,"
as Montefiore has written, "no less than his status in creation, must be
little less than God's"53 As Montefiore has further written in regard to
the environment,
Man, because he is in God's image, is a moral being,
accountable to God for his actions; and because be is made in the image of God,
man is also an intelligent being, under an obligation to use his mind
in the exercise
of his dominion and therefore unjustified in abusing his environment
through indifference
or lack of foresight.54
These words are just as appropriate in discussing man himself. Man is
responsible
for the well being of man, as an individual, as a neighbor, as a society and as
a species. This further implies that each man is to he treated as a responsible
human being with the power of choosing his own lifestyles and
destiny. Each person
should be able to choose what he does or does not want inflicted upon his own
body. This is his prerogative and no one else's. The more technological society
becomes the more difficult it becomes to maintain this principle, and yet it is
an indispensible one from a Christian angle.
Man is also responsible for future generations of mats, as much as
for the present
generation. There is a limit therefore to the degree of tampering with future
generations which can he permissible in terms of this principle.
Future generations
have a right to be as fully human as this generation.
This biblical position is our life-line when considering modified man. Cast it
away and no clear principles remain. Macfarlane Burnet believes that "Man
is no longer something made in the image of God, but (is) a part of the whole
world of living things".55 Hence the title of a hook of his
Dominant Mammal.
But where does this take us? How does it guide us through the
maelstrom of perplexing
issues facing us? Leach believes that "we could act like
gods". To what
end? "That we can act confidently with a sense of purpose." We need
a sense of direction to guide us in the choices we have to make. Furthermore,
we need the perspective of eternity. Without this it is more than likely that
man will exploit himself and his world to the full for selfish and
self-defeating
purposes.
Apart from man's knowledge of his relationship to God, of God's standards and
of God's requirements for the created order, what model does man have
for modifying
man? Jacques Ellul has made the rather unflattering comment that those with the
power of remodelling man will make the new human in their own image.57
3. The "ideal" human being
This leads on to the question of what is the aim of modifying man? Is
there such
a being as the "ideal" man? Is there a holistic view of
"man"
at all, or is the being we call man composed of a series of almost
unrelated normalities
and abnormalties?
These are crucial philosophical questions for our generation, because humanism
has brought us to the point of denying the existence of a meaningful
man. Instead,
what it presents to us is a mass of determined, reductionistic pieces
of information
that, by modifying human beings, it is attempting to build into a
"new"
man-the humanistic ideal of a human being.
The
concept of the "ideal" is itself a humanistic one, and so
the "ideal"
human being is a vision of
ethics and moral philosophy, not of biology.58 Carl
Henry works out the consequences of this position a little further.
He recognizes
that
central to the current conflict over the ideal image of man is the contemporary
uncertainty about who or what man really is. It has not yet dawned on
our contemporaries
that their creative postulation of a novel man, if consistently ventured, must
involve a total severance with man as Christianity has known him-man
ideally imaged
in Jesus of Nazareth, man who owes his existence to a divine creator
and preserver.59
Man is also responsible for future generations of man, as much as for the present generation.
Man as we know him is therefore the man we are to strive to help, and
the guidelines
we follow in modern biology are found in man as we now know him. Does
this principle
then invalidate much of the genetic transplantation and
neurobiological developments
I have been discussing? My answer is "No". We are
surrounded by individuals
suffering from defects of one sort or another; the remedy of these defects and
the alleviation of suffering are cardinal principles of medicine which apply as
much in modern biological medicine as in more traditional medicine. A line must
be drawn however, between this approach and that which attempts to improve man
according to unspecified goals.
Even this principle though may lead to a surprising degree of modification of
man within certain limits. It does not justify reactionary cries of alarm. We
are to he modern but in a Christian way.
4. The dehumanization of man
This is intimately involved in the search for the "ideal"
man. The danger
is that it ends as a dehumanization, involving a depersonalization, of man. A
great deal of thought needs to be devoted to working out the
implications of dehumanization.
As a start it might be worth suggesting that deviation from the creation ideal
is implied in dehumanization. As a part of the creation ideal we see
a close association
of sex and marriage, marriage and parenthood, and childrearing with
home .60 While
these associations may or may not be inviolable rules, they are clear pointers
in the direction God intended human life to proceed.
Any major cleavage within them is an aspect of dehumanization. The
extent to which
any of the procedures I have outlined are dehumanizing will have to
he considered.
Are there, for example, any circumstances under which AID. would be acceptable
from a biblical standpoint? Does it automatically breach the marriage bond? It
can be argued that it imparts into the marriage relationship
something from outside,
something which does not stem from the relationship itself. Viewed in this way
it falls short of the creation ideal,61 and opens the way to
mechanistic trends.
In relationship to AID. I believe an essential consideration concerns
the reasons
for desiring it. Are these motives humanistic or are they concerned
with the welfare
of the two parties in the marriage? Does the latter motive ever justify A.I.D.
from a biblical perspective? Similar questions need he asked in all the areas
I have considered. Is ESB to control rage ever justified? Again, there may be
situations in which biblical principles will allow it, and others in which they
will contraindicate it.
5. Freedom and change
The biological developments discussed in this paper bring us face-to-face with
the reality of change in our lives. This presents us with the
challenge of confronting
change, both in the biological world and in our attitudes, and of deciding what
we are prepared to do with it. Are we determined to resist change,
come what may,
or will we accept it and strive to see it in a Christian perspective so that we
can help decide the kind of change to be adopted?
Attitudes have already changed enormously. For instance contraception has had
a vast effect on attitudes towards marriage, the fetus and perhaps the quality
of life for our children. Has Christian thinking promoted any of these changes,
or has it been defeated repeatedly as it has unsuccessfully resisted them? We
must think through issues concerning modified man, because the issues
either are,
or will shortly he, on our doorsteps. Change will not slow down to
allow the Christian
Church to catch up.
Accompanying these changes in the life of man is an increase in his freedom and
in the extent of his control over himself and others. Man however, is
not as free
as humanists often assert, and yet he has greater freedom than we
sometimes like
to admit. Society is not a vast laboratory as some would believe, but neither
is it a museum. Man is on the move, and it is the task of the
Christian to remind
scientists that the "man" they wish to control is a fellow citizen,
a human like themselves. It is also relevant to point out, as Langdon
Gilkey has
suggested, "that there is less freedom in the knower and
controller through
his knowledge than most descriptions of the potential uses of science seem to
assume."62
6. Optimism or pessimism?
New men have not as yet been made, although the old man can, within stringent
limits, be modified. Does this hold out hope for a glorious future?
To some humanists,
it does.63 To some scientists, it does; to others, it is more like the brink of
catastrophe.64
Sir George Pickering confronted with the possibility of an indefinite extension
of human life commented: "I find this a terrifying prospect, and I am glad
I shall be dead and will have ceased to make my own contributions to
this catastrophe
before it happens".65
For the Christian it should remind him of the conflict between man's
old and new
spiritual natures, and of the conflict between good and evil within
the universe.
Whatever man can make of man, it is God who is in ultimate control, and however
all powerful man may appear, he remains the creature in a God upheld world.
The Christian is to continue living in faith, knowing that God's purposes for
him and for mankind are no less exciting in the 1970's than at any
period in the
past. The Christian is to reflect the image of God inhis life, his thinking and his contribution to society. It is for him
to see that,
as far as he is able, man is modified according to God's and not man's precepts.
REFERENCES
Dates in brackets refer to the original date of publication.
1Rosenfeld, A., The
Second Genesis, Arena Books, New York, 1972 (1969), p. 21.
2Ibid., p. 29.
3Leach, E., A Runaway World?, British Broadcasting Corporation, London, 1968, pp. 14, 15.
4Muller, H. J., Genetic progress by voluntarily conducted germinal choice. In G. Wolstcnholme (ed.)
Man and His Future, CIBA
Foundation, Churchill,
London, 1967 (1963). p. 261.
5Crick, F., Discussion on ethical considerations. In Wolstenholme, Ibid., pp. 364, 380.
6Kass, L. R., New beginnings in Life, In M. P. Hamilton (ed.), The New Genetics
and the Future of Man, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1972, p. 20.
7See my comments in Jones, D. G., Teillsard de Chordin: An Analysis
and Assessment,
Tyndale Press, London, 1969, pp. 43-49.
81 am grateful to Dr. James Houston, Principal of Regent College, Vancouver for
his emphasis on the contribution of the professional disciplines to
theology.
9Toffler, A., Future Shock, Pan, London, 1971 (1970), pp.
172-201.
10Ibid,, p. 182.
11Rosenfeld, A. op cit., p. 29
12Huxley, A., Brave New World, Penguin, Harmondsworth,
1955 (1932), pp. 17, 18
l3Edwards, R. C. and Sharpe, R. J., Social values and research
in human embryology, Nature (1971), 231, 87
l4See the discussions by Leach, G., The Biocrats, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1972 (1970), pp. 99-102
l5Edwards and Sharpe, op cit., pp. 87, 88
16Idem.
17Edwards, H. G., 'Aspects of human reproduction'. In W. Fuller
(ed.), The Biological Revolution, Anchor Books, New York, 1972 (1971), p. 136
181bid., p. 137
191bid., pp. 137, 138
20See examples quoted by Kass, op cit., pp. 28, 29
21Ramsey, P., Fabricated Man, Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1970, p. 113
22Kass, op. cit., p. 30
23Ibid., p. 34
24Leach, op. cit., pp. 86.98
25Glass, B., 'Science endless horizons or golden age?' Science,
(1971), 171, 28
26Idem.
27Leach, op. cit., p. 115
28Taylor, C. H., The Biological Time Bomb, Panther, London,
1969 (1968), p.86
29Edwards and Sharpe, op. cit., p. 88
30See Rosenfeld, ob. cit., p. 147
30oSee Nature (1974), 250, 278-280 for discussion of plasmid engineering.
31For a discussion of genetic engineering see Leach, op. cit.,
pp. 153-160; also Penrose, L. S., 'Ethics and eugenics'. In
Fuller, op. cit., pp. 112-120
32Leach, ibid., p. 159
33Rosenfeld, op. cit., p. 143
34Bamsey, P., Genetic therapy. In Hamilton, op. cit., p. 159
35Taylor, op cit., p. 29
36Haldane, J. B. S., Biological possibilities in the next ten
thousand years. In Woistenholme, op. cit., p. 353
37See Gordon, J. B., Transplanted nuclei and cell differentiation, Scientific American (1968), 219, 24-35
38See Edwards and Sharpe, op. cit., pp. 88, 89; Leach, op. cit., pp. 110-1 15;
also Kass, op. cit., pp. 45-49
39Leach, ibid., p. 114
40Kass, op. cit., p. 48
41Gontrast Clarke, A. C. Profiles of the Future, Pan, London
1964 (1962), pp. 225, 226
42Taylor, op. cit., p. 90
43Ibid., pp. 91-94
44Clarke, op. cit., p. 233
45MacKay, D. M., The human brain, Science Journal (1967), 3, 47
46Taylor, op cit., p. 161
47See Olds, J., Emotional centres in the brain, Science Journal, op
cit., 87.92
48For descriptions of some of Delgado's experiments see Rosenfeld op cit., pp. 197.211; Leach, op cit., pp. 227-233;
also Delagdo, Physical Control of the Mind, Harper and
Row, N.Y. (1969)
48aFor a critique of psychosurgery, see Valenstein, E. S.,
Brain Control, Wiley, N.Y. (1973)
48bMark, V. H. and Ervin, F, K., Violence and the Brain, Harper and Row, N. Y.
(1970)
49Rosenfeld, op cit., p. 211
50For a brief account of these drugs see Alexander, D., Beyond
Science, Lion Publishing, Berkhamsted, 1972, pp. 25.32
51Fnr an interesting discussion of this issue, sec Rose, S., The
Conscious Brain,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973, pp. 294-303
52Genesis 1 26, 27; Psalm 8 5 ff; Hebrews 2 7-9
53Montefiore, H., Can Man Survive? Collins Fontana, London,
1970 (1969), p. 57
54Ibid., p. 58
55Burnet, Macfarlane, Dominant Mammal, Penguin, Ringwood,
1971 (1970), p. 28
56Leach, op cit., p. 809
57Quoted by Alexander, op cit., p. 25
58Hertz, K. H., What can man make of man. In K. Haseldcn and
P. Hefner (eds.), Changing Man the Threat and the Promise, Anchor Books, Garden
City, 1969 (1968), p. 104
59Henry, C. F. H., The new image of man. In C. Hatfield (ed.), The Scientist and
Ethical Decision, Inter Varsity Press, Illinois, 1973, pp. 170, 171
60Alexander, op cit., pp. 206, 207
61Indem..
62Gillkey, L., Evolutionary science and the dilemma of freedom
and determinism. In Haselden and Flelner, op cit., pp. 72, 73
63See for example Burnet, op cit., p. 215; Lederberg, J., Biological future of
man. In Wolstenholme, op cit., pp. 268-270; Glass, op cit., p. 29.
64Examples quoted by Taylor, op cit., pp. 239, 240
65Ibid., p. 239