Science in Christian Perspective
The Brain and Behavior
JOHN D. CARTER
Rosemead Graduate School of Psychology
Rosemead, California 91770
From: JASA 26 (December 1974): 165-168.
Presumptuous but Necessary
A discussion of the relationship between the brain and behavior at this point
in the development of science may be both presumptuous and necessary.
Presumptuous,
because the disagreement among psychologists themselves regarding
theory, method
and the specific subject matter of psychology is so vast that little consensus
could be found by Koch (1959, 1962) in his six volume review of
psychology. Karczmar
and Eccles' volume Brain and Human Behavior (1971) does not indicate that the
neurosciences are significantly better off than psychology when they
come to interpreting
their research findings. Yet, however presumptuous the task appears, it seems
necessary to attempt to bring some order and conceptual understanding
to the exponential
increase in the research evidenced by an increase in the size and
number of journals
in both psychology and neuroscienecs.
This paper presents (1) a description of two significant areas of research in
psychology, (2) an analysis of some methodological implications of these areas
for brain research, and (3) a discussion of some of the traditional solutions
to the brain-behavior problem.
Attitude Change
Attitude change is one of the most recently developed and most
actively investigated
areas of research in psychology. An examination of the literature
indicates that
this area has generated more research and theorizing than any other area in the
last ten to fifteen years with the possible exception of behavior
therapy (Abelson, Aronsori, McGnire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, and Tannenbaum, 1966).
Although some reviewers of the development of attitude theory and research do
not agree on whether the trend is moving from conceptualizing
attitudes unidimensionally
to multidimensionally (Fishbein, 1967), or from multidimcnsionally to
unidimensionally (Insko, 1968), there does seem to he general agreement that three factors are
involved: affect, cognition, and motivation-behavior (Secord and Backman, 1964).
In the unidimensional view the affective tendency to evaluate objects
positively
or negatively is the attitude. Cognitions (beliefs) and behavior are
some complex
function
of the attitude proper. In the multidimensional view all three
factors are components
of the attitude. Only future research will determine which is the correct view.
However, in either view affective, cognitive and conativc components
are functionally
and intimately linked. The linkage of these three components can also
be observed
in the discussion of personality. Rogers (1959) and Gendlin (1962) specifically
assert that cognition and feeling cannot be separated. Gendlin (1964)
also maintains
that behavior can carry forward or symbolize feelings. Furthermore,
Rogers (1959)
argues that a fully functioning individual is "congruent in his experience
(of the feeling), his awareness (of it), and his expression (of
it)," i.e.,
in his affect, cognitions and his behavior. In addition, Maddi (1972) asserts
there is a whole category of personality theory and research which
can he classified
as a consistency model of personality. Consequently it is asserted
that the three
components of attitudes also can be the contents of personality. This does not
deny that there may be different types of attitudes in Kelman's
(1966, 1967) sense
or Katz's (1960; Katz and Stotland, 1959) sense. Nor does it deny
that there may
he varying sub-organizations within or between the components in
Newcomb's (1959)
or Rosenberg's (1960a, 1960b) sense. Nor does it deny that some other content(s)
or hierarchical organization may also exist, e.g., the self. The assertion is
simply that the three components of attitudes are the contents of personality
and are organized and changed according to the nature of the
personality process.
The central role given to the concept of congruence, consistency or
balance (the
terms are equivalent) in personality theories (Maddi, 1972) seems to parallel
its central role in almost every attitude change theory (Festinger,
1957; Heider,
1958; Neweomb, 1959; Osgood and Tannenhaum, 1955; Rokeaeh and
Rothman, 1965; Rosenberg
1960a, 1960b). Festinger asserts that dissonance between two eognitions (or a
cognition and a behavior) leads to change. Heider describes imbalanced affect
situations among two persons and an object as productive of change. Neweomb, on
the other hand, speaks of the strain towards symmetry in a system of
orientations
is disequilibrium. In Osgood and Tanneribaum's mathematical theory, evaluations
move
toward congruity and simplicity. Rokeach and Rothman tried to improve on Osgood
and Tannenbaum's theory and describe belief congruence in terms of gestalt-like
configurations. Rosenberg describes attitude change in terms of inconsistency
of affect and cognitions. Clearly these theories are different, partly because
they are attempting to explain different aspects of attitude change.
Nevertheless,
the overriding similarity is congruence or balance as an explanatory concept.
The principle of reinforcement is used as an auxiliary explanatory concept by
some of the above theorists. Others (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Sarnufl,
1962) use it as a central concept. Assuming that incongruence and reinforcement
do in fact produce attitude change it is not difficult to explain why
this should
be so. If personality is an ongoing process of organized components (attitudes)
which is interacting with the environment, imbalance in the
organization or stimuli
from the environment (reinforcement) could lead to reorganization
(attitude change)
of the expected environmental contingencies. A more extensive review
of the theories
which use congruence to explain attitude change cannot he made at this point.
However , if the three components of attitude: affect, cognition, and conation,
are also the contents of personality, then it is to be expected that congruence
or balance should play a central role in explaining attitude change as well as
a great deal of psychological functinnings. This expectation can be supported
in Inskn's (1968) as well as Abelson's (1968) survey of attitude change theory
and research. More recently Feather (1971) has conceptualized his
extensive research
on behavioral and cognitive expectancies in a consistency model.
Imitation
The second area of research to be examined is Bandura's (1965, 1971),
and Bandura
and Walter's (1965) extensive investigation of imitation. The basic
research setting
is a room full of toys or games in which an adult (experimenter-confederate) is
observed directly or indirectly by a child who is also involved in play to some
extent. If, for example, the adult stages an angry outburst and starts beating
one of the larger dolls in a specifically predetermined manner, then what the
child does at a later time depends on what happens to the adult after his angry
outburst. The expression of the adult-confederate's anger is carried
out in specific
behavioral, verbal and emotional actions which are capable of direct imitation.
The effects on a child of observing this anger or aggression depends
on what happened
to the adultconfederate. If the major experimenter opens the door to
the playroom
at a critically staged moment, finds the adult-confederate beating
the doll, and
reprimands him sharply for his actions, then the child does not
imitate the adult.
If on the other hand, the adult-confederate's aggressive actions go
"undetected
and unpunished," soon the child begins to beat the doll in a
total detailed
imitation including all the verbal, behavioral and emotional
specifies. In addition
to the total imitation the child often adds novel aggressive behavior
or verbalization
of his own. Observation of "undetected and unpunished"
aggression disinhibits
the effects of previously observed "punishment" of an
adult-confederate.
However, perhaps of equal interest for the consideration of this paper is the fact not only that imitation of total detected
complex aggression acts occur, hot that they are imitated in toto
after one observation.
Bandura (1965) and Bandura and Walters (1965) have shown this type of imitation
takes place for many kinds of acts. Thus the significance of their research has
broad implication in that it is not limited to just one type of
action or behavior.
Brain centers from considerably different areas and different systems coordinate the behaviors they regulate in a consistent pattern.
The reason for considering the two types of research described above together
may not be obvious. However, their similarity becomes more apparent when the
different aspects of imitation are examined. In all types of
imitation investigated
there are specific (and often varied) motor responses, verbal
statements and emotional
expressions. These three components appear to be the same components that are
involved in the attitude change research, though in the latter they
are most often
not acted out, but described in paper-and-pencil questionnaires. Also
the consistency
or congruence of the components of the imitated behavior is manifestly evident,
most probably because they were combined and expressed simultaneously
in adult confederate model.
While it is outside the scope of this paper, it might be interesting
to speculate
on the infrequency of inconsistent verbal and motor behavior
accompanying strong
emotion in normal individuals.
Implications for Brain Research
The similarity between functional components involved in these two
bodies of psychological
literature has been stated. Now it is necessary to examine their methodological
implication for brain research. It should be noted that the three
components being
considered, i.e., affect or emotion, speech with its attendant
meanings, and motor
activity with the impulses behind it, are largely regulated by different areas
of the brain. Emotion is largely regulated by the limbic system which
is a suhcortical
system. Meaningful verbalization, with all its complexities excluding the motor
movements of the mouth, is mediated through a number of temporal and
lower parietal
lobe centers, and motor responses are regulated through an area along
the central
fissure in the frontal lobe. While their exact location is not
important for this
discussion, their diversity is. Yet, the observable behavior which stems from
these diverse points in the brain becomes integrated, i.e., brain centers from
considerably different areas and different systems coordinate the
behaviors they
regulate in a consistent or congruent pattern. This congruent pattern
is the first
implication for neuroresearch.
As indicated above, Bandura and Walters (1965) have shown congruent
patterns can
be acquired in one observation. They call it vicarious learning. What
is important
here, however, is not learning but the congruent pattern itself. For
the attitude
change research the pattern is already in the individual and only assessed by the researcher.
The consistency or congruency comes into play when the experimenter
produces inconsistency
either through verbal persuasion or emotional manipulation. When
attitude change
occurs with the individual, a new consistency or congruency among the verbal,
affective and behavioral-motivational components results. Change
appears to take
place because the experimental conditions prevent return to the
original congruency.
This need or tendency to congruency is the second implication though
it may well
be only a more general statement of the former.
Congruency or consistency may appear to he only a new term for old neuroscience
concepts such as integration, organization or system. However, the components
of the congruent psychological patterns or processes are different. It is this
difference which appears to be of immense methodological importance
if meaningful
research work on the brain-behavior problem is to move forward
towards a solution.
Neuroscience as well as physiological psychology has long attempted
to coordinate
specific motor, memory or sensory experiences with specific brain mechanism or
neural structure.
However, it is the larger or more complex organization, described in
the imitation
and attitude change research under the term consistency or
congruency, which appears
never to have been related to a neural substratum and which may
provide the appropriate
structures, processes, or mechanisms for coordinating psychological functions
and brain functions. Which size units are the most appropriate to investigate
and which are the most fundamental to either or both areas of
research? This question
raises an empirical and methodological issue which may have epistemological and
theoretical implications. The issue is not new. The molarmolecular or
the wholistie-atomistic
issue has appeared frequently in the history of biological, psychological and
social sciences. (Matson, 1964; Chaplin and Krawiee, 1968). Perhaps the issue
of which unit to employ is related to a more basic issue. Scientists
in the social
or life sciences who prefer the automatic or molecular level concepts tend to
view their field after the model of physics or chemistry, while those
who prefer
molar or wholistie level concepts tend not to model their discipline
after physics (Allport, 1947; Jessor, 1958).
To use an operationally defined neural concept or event to explain a mental or behavioral event is an equivocation of its meaning.
The occurrences of differences in the model, processes and units to he employed
between the sciences which deal with nonliving inorganic matter and those which
deal with living organic matter is not surprising since by definition
living matter
is organized and reactive. However, the human sciences, i.e., those which deal
with what has traditionally been called mind or behavior, are
manifestly different
in experimental methodology from the physical sciences. Some examples will be
given from psychology at the conclusion of this section of the paper. Experimenters in perception and learning
regularly ask the
subjects to report on the characteristics of the stimulus or their responses,
or more significantly, whether the apparatus is correctly adjusted (fitted) to
the part of the body being employed in the research. This subject effect seems
to have no counterpart in research in the physical sciences (Orne,
1962). Furthermore,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to get social psychology research published
if controls for "seeing through" the deception or
manipulation involved
are not adequate. Frequently, subjects who do "see through"
the manipulation
are excluded from the data tabulation.
Subject reactivity in some form (e.g., response bias and demand
characteristics)
is probably the biggest single methodological problem in social psychology and
personality testing (Oroe, 1962; Block, 1972; Weber and Cook, 1972).
This methodological
problem reflects something fundamentally different in the subject
matter itself.
This difference appears to me to call for a different model and different size
unit in the human sciences, which in turn calls for a relating of these units
to those which are appropriate at the brain level. Although the above
discussion
may not have brought the solution to the mind-brain problem, hopefully it has
clarified some of the methodological issues.
Traditional Solutions to Mind-Brain Problem
Beloff (1962) maintains that the traditional positions on the
mind-brain problem
reduce to four logical possibilities: (1) mind is reducible to brain, (2) brain
is reducible to mind, (3) there are two distinct separate levels which may or
may not interact, and (4) the two are not really separate, but
related to a third
more fundamental phenomenon. Beloff's assignment of the traditional
views to these
four logical possibilities is not of importance here and the four
logical positions
serve only as a backdrop with which to interact. While different
schools of psychology
have preferred one or another of the four solutions (Marx and Flillix, 1963),
physiological psychologists (Morgan, 1965) and many neuroscientists
seem to favor
explicitly or implicitly reducing mental events to brain events (Karezmar and
Eccles, 1971). While there are problems with each position on the
mind-body problem,
there seem to be particular methodological problems with accepting
the reduction
of mind to brain. In spite of the sophisticated discussion of advanced research
in neuroscience and its implications for the brain behavior problem
(e.g., Taylor;
McMullio's and Toumin's attempt to avoid reductionism and dualism by accepting
"Congruency" systems), Karczmar and Eccles (1971, p. 14,15) seem to
embrace an implicit reductionism, apparently unaware of the
methodological inadequacies
of such a position.
The occurrence of neurological "expectancy" waves or
"decision"
waves prior to a decision appears to be accepted as an explanation
for a decision
even if it does not appear to be explanatory, or at least
"feel" explanatory
in an interior sense, The "even if" part of the argument
does not create
the difficulty. It is the acceptance of a neural correlate as an
explanatory concept
for a conscious event (even if it antedates it) that creates a basic scientific
methodological problem that cannot he surmounted. If a scientific concept is to
have scientific meaning, it must be empirically and operationally
The reduction of mental events to brain events is excluded in science. Neural events or brain events can be only correlates of mind or behavioral events in a scientific theory.
defined, i.e., defined by the measurements used to assess it, or be a
hypothetical construct grounded on both its anterior and posterior
side in operationally
defined constructs. For example, the physical concept of force is
defined as the
product of two operationally defined entities, mass and acceleration.
There is nothing in the operational definition (measurement) of the firing of
neuron(s) which would or could relate a wave of negative electrical potential
to a conscious decision. Such a wave might "explain" other waves or
the absence or presence of electrical activity in related nerves, but it cannot
by its own definition explain a conscious or mental event. To use an
operationally
defined neural concept or event to explain a mental or behavioral event is an
equivocation of its meaning, and creates instead a speculative concept (which
is devoid of scientific meaning) but which masquerades as scientific
because its
scientific "name" remains. That is, scientific concepts obtain their
meaning from their operational definition and by being embedded in a network of
similarly defined scientific concepts. When a concept is used to explain events
outside its own operationally defined network, it loses its meaning
and thus its
capacity to explain.
Consequently, the reduction of mental events to brain events is
excluded in science,
i.e., reductionism is not a scientifically acceptable solution to the mind-brain
problem. This conclusion does not imply that dualism or some other solution is
correct. Time and space do not permit the discussion of other
alternative solutions
to the brain-behavior problem. The elimination of reductionism occurs
on scientific
grounds, not metaphysical or philosophical ones, i.e., science by its
own nature-the
use of operational constructs-is responsible for this exclusion. Thus, neural
events or brain events can be only correlates of mind or behavioral events in
a scientific theory.
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