Science in Christian Perspective
A Christian Definition of Death
BERNARD RAMM
American Baptist Seminary of the West
Covina, California
From: JASA 25 (June 1973): 56-60.
This article is written in the form of a response to Robert B. Morison, "Death Process or Event?" and, Leon R. Kass, "Death as an Event: A Commentary on Robert Morison," Science, 173:694-702, August 20, 1971
One of the results of the great sophistication of modern medical technology is
the creation of imponderable ethical crises. One of these crises is
the definition
of death. We now know it is a continuous and complex process so that
we may speak
of many kinds of death, (brain death, physiological death, medical
death, cellular
death, legal death, etc.). Furthermore the same sophisticated
technology may prolong
dying or shorten it. In prolonging death, machines may replace one of the major
life-systems of the body (breathing, heart
beat). Heart transplantation has brought this techno-logical crisis to its most
dramatic focus. In order to cope with this increasing sophistication in medical
technology and its impact on the problem of death (for it is not only a medical
problem but a legal one, a social one, and a psychological one) a new journal
has been founded: The Journal of Thanatology (from the Greek word for
death, thanatos,).
In the articles by Morison and Kass one scientist offers his opinions
on the problem
of defining death in the light of the new technology and the second
offers a critique
of the first with some observations of his own (Morison vs. Kass)
A Naturalist View
ApparentlyMorison is a thorough-going naturalist and reductionist, for to him
the difference between the living and the dead is apparent, not real. There is
one spectrum of chemical changes wherein we arbitrarily call one part
of it "life,"
as if life were a thing or a substance. The passage from one set of
classifiable
chemical reactions (the so-called processes of living protoplasm) to another is
a continuum and it is only by social custom that we specify death as
an event.
Morison rejects any attempt to redefine death, as that would presume
the old errors
over again that "life" is some sort of essence and that death is some
sort
of event. As far as medical practices are concerned he thinks the
difficult cases
(shortening or prolonging life) should be decided upon by a team. He ends his
article by making a case for euthanasia. A patient knowing of an
impending terrible
illness and death could talk the matter over with his doctor and settle on some
sort of procedure for euthanasia. Morison has a good word for men like Eastman
and Bridgman, who when informed of their incurable and painful
disease, committed
suicide and shortcut the whole lamentable process of a prolonged and agonizing
dying.
Rebuttal by Kass
Kass's article is a point-by-point rebuttal of Manson's basic theses.
What Morison
and Kass have in common is the recognition of the complex decisions
modern technological
medicine puts on the back of the doctor. To Kass death is an event no
matter how
much recent bio-medicine has shown how difficult it is to define.
There is a distinct
difference between a living body and a dead cadaver and not a
continuum of chemical
processes where for society's sake we draw an artificial line of death. As Kass
remarks, according to Monison's thesis, there is no such thing as murder, for
murder is only a process to Morison!
Furthermore Monison's pragmatic solutions to difficult cases are not
that simple.
Value judgments are involved in every decision and values cannot he settled by
votes nor weighed in grams. He also contests Morison's brief for an
intelligently
planned euthanasia between patient and doctor when the patient is in
full possession
of his senses. There is a difference between letting a patient die
(such as stopping
a heart-pacer or respirator) and actually doing something to induce death. Kass
is very insistent that in no situation should the doctor ever leave his role as
healer and take on that of a killer.
Christian Insights
Fortunately Christians who are knowledgeable in these matters have also written
on these topics and attempt to bring theological insights to
decision-making dilemmas
in technologically advanced medicine. We look at three such
attempts to correlate
Christian ethics with the topics discussed by Morison and Kass,
1. Harmon L. Smith, Ethics and the New Medicine
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1970).
Coming to terms with these problems in chapter 4 of his book Smith follows the
set pattern in which he writes the entire book. The first part of the chapter
reviews the complexities of the problem from a strictly medical standpoint with
specific examples; then be cites the opinions of some theologians;
and he con
cludes with his own judgments.
One of the crises medical technology has produced is connected with
organ transplants.
We know that dying is a process and that there are many kinds of death (e.g.,
brain, cellular, etc.). Modern practices in organ transplanting seem to require
a Stage I death at which time an organ may be removed from the
patient and a Stage
II death where the body is a cadaver and is to he buried.
A second crisis produced by modern medical technology is just the reverse. When
a person has passed a certain stage in his disease or injury so that
reversibility
of health or life is impossible, what right has the doctor to prolong the life
of such a patient? Or to put it another way, at what point is a
doctor no longer
under the stipulations of the Hippocratic oath?
In matters of medicine and technology Smith cites Barth and Bonhooffer as being
extremely conservative or reserved. To both of them Cod and God alone has the
right to end life and man may do nothing to end the process or hasten
it. Barth's
one concession is that in relieving pain the powerful dosages may as
a secondary
cause (not primary!) shorten life. Smith thinks that the experiments
in medicine
by the Nazis may have influenced Bonboeffer's position but he believes there is
an inconsistency in Bonhoeffer's support for the plot to assassinate
Hitler.
Smith then discusses Fletcher and we find the pendulum swinging wildly (as can
he anticipated) to the other side of its periorl. Fletcher wades in
where theologians,
doctors and angels fear to tread and says we ought to do without dispatch what
love, common sense, and a regard for humanity (and humanness) dictate. Fletcher
says a person ought to die in dignity and not at the end of a long
drawn out debilitating,
dehumanizing and undignified period of suffering.
Smith then turns to his own convictions. As a Christian his basic
conviction is:
1) to perceive as clearly as possible God's will, as this is manifest in Jesus Christ, and to relate that will to the conduct of human affairs; and (2) to assess the coherence and congeniality between particular actions and affirmed values. (p. 152).
In the matter of dying, transplants, and the prolongation of life the focus becomes sharper:
Theologians, especially, must insist that the management of terminal illness or injury sustain, as tar as possible, the personal dignity and integrity of the patient, together will) the interpersonal values of the relationships between the patient and the larger contexts of other persons, particularly the immediate family. (p. 165, italics are his).
In context Smith is denying that any simple criterion is possible to
follow, whether
it be medical (e.g., we are only sure of death when nidation sets in)
or motivational
(whets the doctor is motivated by "innocence" where in
other situations
it would be considered a crime). Decision making in medically complex
situations
is a vectoring process which includes all factors.
Smith then becomes very specific. As Christians we may consider a person dead
when be has undergone personality death (my expression, reflecting
Smith's discussion
and terminology). Personality death occurs whets it is medically
ascertained that
there is an "irreversible loss of consciousness and function" due to
the extensive damage of the brain. At that point the Christian may consider the
patient as a cadaver and its organs may be used for any reliable
medical use-even
though other organs or systems show signs of being alive or a machine
is replacing
a life system.
Concerning people who are hopelessly damaged or hurt, especially in the brain,
the doctor is faced with three options:
(1). The doctor has the moral right to withhold or withdraw all
mechanical supporting
machines. Smith assents to this.
(2). The doctor has the moral right to administer pain-relieving
drugs which may
hasten the person's demise. Smith assents to this.
(3). The doctor has the moral right to actually induce death by drugs or other
means (such as pumping air into the arteries). Smith disagrees at this point.
Fle says that most theologians, lawyers and doctors would agree on points (1)
and (2).
To sum up, Smith tries to go from general Christian convictions to
specific points
in medical ethics: (1) lie does believe that organs may be taken from patients
who have suffered personality death; and (2) he does not believe that doctors
should use all measures possible to prolong senselessly the inevitable ebbing
away of life in catastrophic cases.
2. Hemut Thielecke, "The Doctor as Judge of Who
Shall Die." Kenneth Vaux, editor, Who Shall Live:
Medicine, Technology, Ethics (Philadelphia: Fort
ress Press, 1970). Pp. 146-186
Thielecke is a distinguished professor at the University of Hamburg
who has written
several massive volumes in a set on Christian Ethics. He was also one
on the few
men left after the end of World War II who proved a real point of
beginning again
for a dispirited German nation.
Like any other person interested in medical ethics lie has read extensively in
medical literature and medical ethics. Thielecke has also been
personally involved
in much counseling in medical eases. Furthermore, more than any other writer in
ethics (as I have read them) he attempts to be as Biblical as he can, drawing
very consciously from Biblical materials.
His first point is that the Hippocratic oath calls upon doctors to
preserve human
life, not biological life, That 'which makes man human is his huoianom or image
of God (imago Dei). When the humanism is no longer there, the moral obligation
of the doctor to follow the Hippocratic oath no longer exists. This he reasons
from Genesis 1. Animals and plants are created. But man is specially
created and
called by name and addressed as a thou, a person. This leads him to a
modern definition
of man with "the consciousness of self" as "the critical sign of
human existence" (p. 161). The corollary is that "a man devoid of any
trace of selfconsciousness, 'would be, as it were, merely a
biological culture"
(p. 162).
If a man is no longer addressable as a person or a thou, if he no
longer possesses
the homanum or the imago, lie is, from the standpoint of Christian
theology, dead
as a person. Scientists may then use the body for transplants or for whatever
else medical science may use a body for. Technological difficulties
in determining
when a person has lost his humanism and become a culture should not
deter us from
operating with such a distinction. With the increase of medical knowledge the
point of transition will become less ambiguous.
In this exposition there is a treatment of a theological theme that should not
go unnoticed. According to Tluelecke (as a theologian) man lives in
the halflight
of creation and sin. This is God's world and man is God's creation.
This is clear.
But sin has entered the world and man is a sinner. The light of creation is not
extinguished but yet burns. This Thielecke calls the halflight of the existence
of a sinner. In a half-light many moral decisions are ambiguous
because we cannot
sec clearly. All man's existence is in half-light and therefore shot through-andthrough
with ambiguities.
Medical ethics does not escape these ambiguities. Medical ethic's will always
be fraught with problems because decisions in medicine are made in half-light,
as are all other moral choices, and therefore will suffer from ambiguities. To
expect simple, direct, easy answers in medical ethics is to misunderstand the
essential ambiguity of human existence. Although he makes no
reference to Fletcher,
this is a devastating attack upon Fletcher's bold pronouncements in
medical ethics,
where lie seems to speak as if he stood in the clarity of daylight and not in
the half-light of human sinfulness with its inescapable ambiguities.
Thielecke does not believe a flickering life ought to be prolonged by
heroic medical
measures. It should be mentioned parenthetically that Thielecke has been a
wheel-chair case himself and is not talking pure theory. He admits that be has
a hard time finding moral arguments for not prolonging a flickering life for he
feels that his answer is more intuitive than reasoned. Yet he does
some reasoning.
Hebrews 9:27 says that it is given to man once to die. What is the logic then
of dragging out the flickering period of man if man does have such an
inevitable
appointment? Or, in prolonging a flickering life do we really prolong agony and
not life?
We know that dying is a process and that there are many kinds of death.
Thieleeke then, thinking deeply as a theologian, raises the question
of suffering.
Maybe we ought to let life keep flickering. We kill an injured animal because
suffering is not an ethical issue to an animal. It is a burden and
man mercifully
shoots a horse with a broken leg. But suffering is an ethical problem
to man and
we don't shoot a man if he breaks his leg. When then does a doctor
frustrate suffering
by refusing to prolong life; and when does he expect a patient to
endure suffering
as part of his lot as a moral creature? Thielecke admits that there is no rule
of thumb to differentiate cases, so that in some instances we end suffering and
in others we permit the patient to endure suffering as an ethical challenge. In
the language of the English, Thielecke says that in such eases we can
only "muddle
through."
When it comes to organ transplants Thieleeke suddenly flips on us. He deserts
his Biblical exposition, his theological resources, and his ethical analyses.
He simply announces that when a person is in an irreversible coma due
to extensive
brain damage he has become a cadaver and a doctor may use the cadaver
as he wishes
as a medical researcher. It is not a religious or a moral question
(p. 176).
But has he not forgotten himself? Did he not previously state that
when the humanism
is gone the person has become a biological culture? This he bases on Biblical
texts and their theological implications. To be consistent he should have said
it is, morally right to use a biological culture for transplants and not that
it is a morally or theologically indifferent matter.
3. Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Explorations in
Medical Ethics, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1970. The Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale University.
Of the three Christian moralists we have read in connection with the
issues raised
by the Morison-Kass article Ramsey is both the best and the poorest.
He is the best in that he has written an entire book on this subject
and related
subjects with extensive medical, ethical and theological
documentation. Our discussion
of Ramsey cannot begin to do justice to the enormous amount of materials he has
amassed and the mastery of them manifested in the way in which he handles them.
He is no research grubber who can dig out a mass of data but is
helpless to assess
it and interpret it.
It is the poorest book however, because the theological elements are so far in
the background. If he had not tipped us off (very rarely) of his Christian
Protestant stance we would assume he was writing merely as a
philosophical ethicist.
We know from his other ethical writings that he is very well
acquainted with the
Christian ethical heritage and is the most articulate critic of the "shoot
and ask questions later" ethics of Joseph Fletcher. Frequently
when he states
"from the standpoint of ethics" he really means "from
the standpoint
of Christian ethics." So what I mean by saying that his is the poorest of
the three books, is that he does not make his connections between his theology,
his ethics, and his medical ethics as obvious as Smith and Thielecke do.
My impression from reading Ramsey is that his decisions about medical ethics,
and especially the extreme kinds of cases we are dealing with in this article,
are based on two premises:
(1) Medical technology is in such a rapid state of progress and transition that
Christian ethicists ought to move very slowly and not plunge into the situation
with premature rules or principles. Here he parts company with
Fletcher who wants
to cut loose radically from the binding cords of the past and retool
medical ethics
according to the latest theory or practices. Ramsey has much appreciation for
Hans Jonas and his extreme regard for the patient and life no matter
how low the
candle flickers and for Barth's extreme regard for God as the
Creator, Lord, and
Determiner of our lives (even though he does think Barth is too extreme in the
way he uses this principle in medical ethics).
(2). The ultimate value in medical ethics is the person, or the
patient as a person.
To be specific, the need for organs for transplants might make social needs the
basic value in medical ethics; or from our knowledge of genetics we might make
consideration of future generations (as Thieleeke sometimes does) the
basic value.
Ramsey resists this and makes the patient as a person the primary
value in medical
ethics.
This second principle comes out clearly when he discusses the
necessity of updating
death. He is aware of all the technicalities of the problem. But he seems far
more informed of the complications of updating death than Smith or Thieleeke.
What doctors call brain death Smith calls personality death and Thieleekc calls
it loss of the humanum. But brain death is not an adequate criterion.
Ramsey chooses
the definition of the Harvard Medical School report of 1968 which
lists four criteria
(which I shall condense): (1) the patient does not respond to the most painful
stimulus; (2) the patient shows no signs of resuming breathing after
being taken
off the respirator for more than three minutes; (3) the patient does
not respond
to any of the standard neurological tests for reflexes; and (4) the
eleetrocncephelogram
is flat.
The Hippocratic oath calls upon doctors to preserve human life, not biological life.
After establishing a more vigorous criterion for death than Smith or Thieleeke
he then makes his main point. We must keep separate our concern for
updating death
with a view to organ transplanting and our concern for a medically
accurate definition
of death. Ramsey's fear is that in our anxiety to transplant
organs we will have a short-cut definition of death in order to get the organ.
This does not do justice to the patient as a person, ignores other
values in the
situation besides the values of a transplant, and could lead to the
actual killing
of a patient because we are working with a definition of death aimed
at transplanting
but not for the ultimate concern of the patient.
With reference to the patient who is catastrophically sick or injured, Ramsey
is again reserved in order to preserve his thesis of the ultimate value of the
patient as a person. He goes into great detail of medical complications about
such cases. The problem hinges around the meaning of the terms
ordinary and extraordinary.
There is general agreement that the doctor is morally obliged to use ordinary
methods for treating a desperately sick person and that it is cruel
and financially
unjustifiable (care of "human vegetables" can cost .825,000
to $30,000
a year) to use extraordinary measures. Then Ramsey shows in a number of cases
that an ordinary measure is really an extraordinary measure, and that in other
cases an extraordinary measure would be considered ordinary. So there
is no simple
definition of ordinary and extraordinary.
But Ramsey does not leave us hanging in the air
because the terms ordinary methods and extraordinary
methods are not capable of simple definition or identification. Ramsey's guides
in this matter are: (1) It is morally proper to give pain-relieving drugs with
the knowledge that as a secondary effect they will shorten life. (2) We must be
very careful in defining what we mean by a doctor doing something by omission
(as if that were morally right) and what he does by commission (as if that were
morally wrong [as in euthanasia]). Medical procedures of omission and
commission
must he determined by the value of the patient as a person and not by
clever definitions
of terms. (3) As a refinement of point (2) Ramsey says that the real point of
any medical procedure of omission or commission is that the doctor be humanely
present with the dying and not treat him as a "ease." (4) A doctor'
should never abandon a patient or hasten the death of a terminally ill patient
except when medical treatment is "entirely indifferent to the
patient"
(p. 161, italics are his).
According to Ramsey one of the most distressing aspects of dying is
not physical
or medical, but psychological. One should not die in solitude. But this is so
often the ease. The terminal patient is in a private room and allowed
visits for
only short periods of time. He eventually dies alone or in the
presence of unknown
hospital personnel. Ramsey thinks that it is not wrong for a patient to die at
home. In the company of his loved ones he makes his transition from
life to death
surrounded by their love and comfort. Further, children, whom we so efficiently
isolate from the terminally dl and the dying, learn that death is part of the
cycle of human existence and not a sudden and foreign catastrophe that happens
to people in hospitals.
Ramsey is not too anxious about heart transplants. The terrible psychological
agony that the patients and the nursing staff go through has been
documented for
us in an article in Life (Thomas Thompson, "A New and Disquieting Look at
Transplants," 71:56-71, September 17, 1971). Ramsey supplies us
with a chart
of disappointing results of transplants to the time of his writing
(p. 232) which
may be updated by referring to the article in Life.
To expect simple, direct, easy answers in medical ethics is to misunderstand the essential ambiguity of human existence.
Transplants throw an enormous responsibility on the doctor. Who shall receive
the kidney or the dialysis machine or the new heart? The usual method of taking
the decision and its awful burden from one doctor is to place it on
the shoulders
of a team within the hospital (doctors, nurses, social workers). The
Swedish Hospital
in Seattle has gone a further step (known in the literature as the
Seattle Experiment).
A committee within society' has been set up of knowledgeable laymen. They are
given the documents on the patients with pertinent medical advice and they are
left to make the decisions. Their identity is kept anonymous for
obvious reasons.
On paper such a committee seems like an excellent idea, as now medical ethics
is the concern of society and not medical experts whose range of concern must
be too professionally limited. But the practice ran into a snag. To prefer one
patient over another is to express a value judgment as to the worth
of individuals.
But there is no common value system under which Americans live. Is
one life more
valuable because of its meaning to the immediate family? Or, is the value of a
life to be judged by its social worth? But what value among social
values is the
higher value? Is an ardent church member whose activities help an
entire community
more valuable than the pharmacist who is the important link between doctor and
patient, yet who may never lift a finger for social reform?
The issues as I see them (in a summary way) are:
(1). Technological medicine is moving faster than our ability to
assess ethically
the decisions it summons us to make.
(2). Medical technology is becoming so complex that it is more and
more difficult
for laymen and perIsaps even well-read theologians to comprehend the
factors involved
and their complex inter-rclatediscss. For example, what does a doctor do when
a patient is suffering from two or more catastrophic diseases at once where the
treatment for one will cause death by the other, etc.?
(3). Team decisions, seem the easiest way out for "playing God" (an
expression we should perhaps eliminate from future discussions because to turn
one shovel of dirt and plant a potato is "playing God" in that it is
not letting nature run its course!) in these catastrophic cases and perhaps in
time we will "muddle through" to a common ethical ground.
(4). Christian theologians have wrestled with these problems and have supplied
theological criteria. However this should not he sporadic but programmatic (as
it now is in the Houston medical complex under the leadership of Kenneth Vaux).
Furthermore, I believe that it should not only include medical
experts and theologians
but knowledgeable Christian laymen.
(5). Of the three men discussed Thielecke has given us the best model (which we
could not adequately reproduce for reasons of space) for a theologian working
ss itls Biblical materials and drawing guide-lines from them for
medical ethics.
One of the most distressing aspects of dying is not physical or medical, but psychological.